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Are Women Human? is a scary book. Mostly, this is by design. It contains
pages and pages of descriptions of various incidents of violence against
women, including beatings, torture, rape, sexual enslavement, murder, and
genocide.' It also contains many terrifying statistics. For example, in the United
States, forty-four percent of all women are victims of rape or attempted rape,2
and between one-quarter and one-third of women are battered in their homes.
3
In many places around the world, the rates for both rape and domestic violence
are even higher.4 These accounts and statistics amply support MacKinnon's
point, raised most starkly in the final chapter,5 that violent death is a reality for
a startling number of women every day and that states and the international
bodies they comprise should wake up to this reality and respond to it. Failure to
do so, MacKinnon persuasively argues, represents a profound hypocrisy on the
part of the international community; indeed, it represents a failure to treat
women as human at all.
As powerful, even devastating, as this argument is, it nevertheless leads to
another reason that Are Women Human? is scary: MacKinnon focuses so
steadfastly on her critique of private power (in particular, private power
wielded by men against women) that, by the end, she seems to have lost sight
of the dangers of "public" power, also wielded mostly by men, and against both
men and women. Yet at this moment in history, though private groups
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5. Id. at 259.
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increasingly act with power and violence previously reserved to states, 6 states
quickly fashion legal justifications for even more violent responses.7 Critiques
of liberalism notwithstanding, 8 public power is still to be feared. If feminists
aspire to harness public power-whether national or international-in the
service of women's equality, we need to consider very carefully the risks and
ethical implications of the inevitable violence that will result. Despite the
creative brilliance of much of her work, MacKinnon does too little of that here.
The question of the book's title, Are Women Human?, is a reference to
Richard Rorty's characterization of MacKinnon's work as suggesting "that 'a
woman' is not yet... a way of being human." 9 More importantly, it is also a
provocative challenge to the international community to rethink the category of
human rights so as to define humanity in a way that includes women. Her basic
point is this: When beating, torture, rape, and extra-judicial killing happen to
men, international law takes the violations seriously (if perhaps not seriously
enough to end them). When those same things happen to women, in settings
largely reserved for the abuse of women and not men, international law regards
the violations as private and domestic (in both senses-meaning within homes
and within states), and therefore beyond its scope.'0
MacKinnon makes this same point forcefully in several different contexts
by asking what it would mean to redefine central concepts of international
human rights law or humanitarian law to include women. She does so primarily
by challenging the divergent treatment under international law of public power,
exercised by states, and private power, exercised by non-state actors such as
corporations, religious institutions, terrorist groups, and individuals. 11 As a
general rule, the former and not the latter are the subject of regulation in public
6. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Turmoil in the Mideast: Haifa, Israel, N.Y.TIMES, July 17, 2001, at A8
(discussing Hezbollah's initial attack on Haifa, Israel, and presaging Israel's response by quoting an
Israeli citizen who says, "We should wipe Hezbollah off the map without pity and without listening to
the criticism from the rest of the world."); A Nation Challenged: President Bush's Address on Terrorism
Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B4 (reprinting President Bush's
discussion of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, noting that Al Qaeda was most likely responsible for
bombing American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya as well as the U.S.S. Cole, and outlining "Al
Qaeda's vision for the world").
7. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad & Steven Erlanger, Turmoil in the Mideast: The Conflict, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2006, at AI (discussing Israel's bombardment of Lebanon after the Hezbollah attack on Haifa);
David Rohde, A Nation Challenged: The Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at Al (reporting the first
strike against Kabul, Afghanistan); Patrick E. Tyler, A Nation at War: The Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2003, at AI (reporting the initial push of American and British troops into Iraq).
8. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing the feminist critique of liberalism's
preoccupation with public power).
9. See Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 MICH. Q. REV. 231, 234 (1991).
10. See MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that "[llegally, one is less
than human when one's violations do not violate the human rights that are recognized").
11. This argument is made in various places throughout the book, but for a general overview, see
id. at 4-8. See also id. at 147 ("[W]hen men use their liberties socially to deprive women of theirs, it
does not look like a human rights violation. When men are deprived of theirs by governments, it does.").
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international law. 12 Abuses of public power, in international law as in United
States constitutional law, may violate individual rights and are regarded as
implicating fundamental norms of political freedom, citizenship, and equality.
In contrast, abuses of private power may (or may not) violate the criminal law
or perhaps constitute a tort, but are not generally understood as sufficiently
systematic and political so as to implicate rights guarantees. MacKinnon sets
out to demonstrate the arbitrariness of this distinction and its implications for
gender hierarchy.
This critique is not original to MacKinnon,' 3 though she applies it here in
novel ways and with characteristic rhetorical power. Focusing on the
relationship among the state, the individual, and civil society, feminists have
argued that the putatively "unregulated" sphere of the family is profoundly
regulated-even constituted-by the state through law and other economic,
administrative, and political institutions of state power. 14 This regulation is
apparent through both direct state intervention and the refusal to intervene, state
inaction.' 5 MacKinnon invokes this analysis in the context of domestic violence
and rape, noting that "the state actually is typically deeply and actively
complicit in the abuses .... 1,,6 She argues that the state's response to these
crimes and the law's (hence the state's) definition of them together constitute
the boundaries of private power in a way that is highly gendered.17 On this
view, we should regard the creation and maintenance of this legal regime as an
12. See Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 409-10 (1979)
(locating the foundation of international human rights law in protection of an individual's "natural
rights" from the state). See, e.g., 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 44 (2006) (noting the
responsibility of states under international law); Riane Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an Integrated
Theory for Action, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 287 (1987) (discussing the implications of the emphasis in
international law on state responsibility).
13. This critique has its roots in Marx's critique of liberal political citizenship. See Karl Marx, On
the Jewish Question, in MARx-ENGELS READER 34 (R.C. Tucker ed., 1978). It was taken up and
developed by feminists more than thirty years ago. See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, DISORDER OF WOMEN:
DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM, AND POLITICAL THEORY 90-117 (1989) (discussing the public/private divide
central to liberalism in an essay first published in 1975); see also CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE
DIVIDE (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997) (collecting essays critical of liberalism's emphasis on public power);
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988) (criticizing the public/private line implicit in the
social contract and its implications for gender hierarchy); PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE (S. I.
Benn & G. F. Gaus eds., 1983) (collecting essays addressing the implications of the public/private line).
14. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1524 (1983) (noting that "once the state undertakes to define the marriage relation,
it is impossible for the state to refuse to engage in some enforcement of the individual will of the
parties"); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835,
837 (1985) (arguing that "because the state is deeply implicated in the formation and functioning of
families, it is nonsense to talk about whether the state does or does not intervene in the family").
15. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, supra note 14, at 854
(citing the selective application of tort and criminal laws within a family as an example of the
incoherence of the intervention/nonintervention paradigm).
16. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 23.
17. See id. at 23-24, 27.
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affirmative act by the state, just as we consider as such the torture of detainees
by military police.
1 8
Confronted with the failure of liberal rights to improve women's unequal
status, feminist legal theorists have also embraced the idea that private power is
at least as significant a threat to women as state power.1 9 On the international
level, feminists have argued that international human rights standards that
forbid torture, but regard violence committed against women by intimate
partners or family members as outside the scope of international concern, fail to
address the central source of violent coercion in women's lives. 2 The argument
is not that the abusive husband acts under color of state law or to promote the
interests of the state.2 1 Rather, the argument is simply that a meaningful right to
freedom, bodily integrity, and security for women must include effective
remedies against private violence.
MacKinnon invokes this critique of the public/private distinction most
powerfully in her analysis of torture. She notes that we all have come to
understand how it works and why it is used: "Victims are beaten, raped,
shocked with electricity, nearly drowned, tied, hung, burned, deprived of sleep,
food, and human contact."2 2 It is done "to control, intimidate, or eliminate those
who insult or challenge or are seen to undermine the powers that be ... "23
She suggests that both the description and the rationale apply equally to many
24cases of domestic violence. MacKinnon asks simply, why are these same acts
taken much less seriously (if noticed at all) when they happen to take place "in
homes in Nebraska.. . rather than prison cells in Chile"?
25
MacKinnon also reinterprets and extends the critique of the public/private
line to expose the gendered dimensions of humanitarian law. For example, she
notes that, ironically, the one context in which international law does directly
protect women from the violence they suffer at the hands of men is when men
are also fighting each other in the name of state power-in short, when they are
18. See id. at 148.
19. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161 (1989)
(arguing that "men's forms of dominance over women have been accomplished socially as well as
economically, prior to the operation of law, without express state acts, often in intimate contexts, as in
everyday life"); ROBIN L. WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 58 (1994) (using the marital rape exemption to argue that a state violates
equal protection when it denies some of its citizens protection from private violence, aggression, and
wrongdoing).
20. See, e.g., Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in
WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 11 (Julie Peters &
Andrea Wolper eds., 1993).
21. Insofar as the state creates and sustains institutions that support men's power, men might be
understood as acting under color of state law, broadly defined. MacKinnon also makes this argument
here. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 23.
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 19-21.
25. Id. at 21.
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at war.26 But why should this be? Why, she asks, is the often armed assault on
women that takes place everywhere daily not regarded as armed conflict under
international law? 27 One reason: states are not waging the war, at least not in
the conventional sense. Women are not generally armed; they are not in
uniform. They do not count as soldiers, whose treatment is regulated by the
Geneva Conventions. At the same time, they are not noncombatants either, at
least so long as there is no war going on among men.28
To the claim that violence perpetrated by men against women does not fit
the international legal concept of war or armed conflict because it does not
involve states as such, MacKinnon has a ready response: Al Qaeda. She
accurately observes that "on September 1 1th, nonstate actors committed
violence against mostly nonstate (nongovernmental and civilian) actors."
29
Yet, despite the fact that the attack did not fit well within conventional
categories, the international community adapted legal norms to accommodate
what it regarded as a necessary response to the perceived threat. Given that the
absence of state power was not an obstacle to international action in the case of
September 11 th, MacKinnon asks why women's suffering and violent death at
the hands of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan triggered no response until
men's lives were also at stake.
30
Finally, MacKinnon also discusses a subtle and important argument about
rape and genocide, or rape as genocide, in the context of her work in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Here, her objective is twofold. First, she wants the concept of
genocide to be understood to comprehend its specifically gendered forms,
including rape and forced maternity.31 This requires her to distinguish rapes
according to their function, whether in genocide, war, or everyday life.32
Responding to claims that the Serbian rape of Bosnian women was an
inevitable byproduct of war, or that the rapes of Bosnia and Croat women were
''merely" an aggravated form of what men do to women all the time and
everywhere, MacKinnon describes how the Serbian military deployed rape in a
deliberate and strategic way, with the purpose of destroying a specific group of
people. "It is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. 3 3 Proof of such
26. Id.at 263 (arguing that if "[r]ealized in what is called peacetime, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions would transform the lives of women everywhere. But you need a war for it to
apply.").
27. Id. at 261.
28. If there were, MacKinnon notes, they would be protected under humanitarian law. Id. at 261-
62.
29. Id. at 264.
30. See id. at 270 (asking why the treatment of Afghan women under the Taliban did not qualify as
terrorism).
31. Id. at 38 ("This is ethnic rape by official policy.").
32. Id. at 37.
33. Id. at 38.
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intent, she argues convincingly, brings some forms of rape within the scope of
the accepted definition of genocide.
34
MacKinnon's second, and more radical, objective-to challenge the limits
of this definition of genocide-is in some tension with the first. Having
carefully drawn legal distinctions among rape in genocide, rape in war, and
rape in everyday life,35 she deliberately undercuts these distinctions by showing
the commonalities in the way rape functions in these different contexts. For
example, she argues that:
what rape does in genocide is what it does the rest of the time: ruins
identity, marks who you are as less, as damaged, hence devastates
community, the glue of the group. It destroys the willingness to
identify with the group designation on the basis of which the rape took
place, hence works to destroy the group as such.36
Noting that "[w]omen not being considered a people, there is as yet no
international law against destroying the group women," she raises the question
of whether targeting a group on the basis of sex ought to be included in the
definition of genocide. 37 The fact that it is not, MacKinnon insists, suggests
how effectively sexual violence has already destroyed the notion that women
are "a people," confirming that woman is "not yet a way of being human."
38
Surely any serious reader of this collection will come away with a changed
perspective on the law of international human rights. Even if one is not fully
convinced by MacKinnon's arguments, she does brilliantly here what she has
always done, that is, call into question the inevitability of the way things are.
She forces us to consider how things might be different and better for women,
not just incrementally within existing structures, but radically within a new
paradigm of international law.
At the same time, the work collected here is characterized by some of the
limitations apparent in MacKinnon's work in other contexts. In my view, the
most important of these include her almost exclusive focus on private violence
as the paradigmatic form of gender subordination, her tendency to overestimate
the potential of legal norms to promote women's equality by targeting that
violence, and, finally, her failure to think systematically about the costs of
invoking state and international power (which often also entails violence) to
improve the status of women. Even while acknowledging the transformative
power of her work, many feminists have raised questions regarding
MacKinnon's analytical framework and reform agenda on the domestic level.
In the remainder of this Review, I build on these critiques to suggest that
34. Id. at 226-27.
35. Id. at 221-22.
36. Id. at 230.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 48 (quoting Rorty, supra note 9, at 234).
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applying her agenda internationally and cross-culturally presents different and
perhaps more troubling issues.
MacKinnon's analysis of women's inequality focuses centrally on violence
against women, particularly sexual violence. This emphasis is consistent with
MacKinnon's work throughout her career, and, as I acknowledge above,
translates in creative and powerful ways to the international sphere. And yet the
analysis here is subject to the familiar critique of her work on domestic law,
that MacKinnon's focus on sexual violation overstates its centrality to women's
subordination.39 Thus, in a book about women's human rights-indeed
women's humanity-MacKinnon says very little about such pressing
determinants of gender inequality as economic and educational discrimination,
the gendered structure of the family (including profoundly unequal rights of
inheritance and property ownership), or starkly gendered assumptions about the
care of children, to name a few. 40 To be clear, MacKinnon does not claim that
these issues are unimportant.4 1 Yet, of twenty-five chapters in this collection,
seventeen deal almost exclusively with either sexual violence or pornography.
And although several chapters deal with equality theory generally, only one
gives sustained treatment to an issue of structural inequality other than sexual
42violence per se.
It is easy enough to criticize an author for not having written a different
book, or one with a different emphasis. That is not my intention. MacKinnon is
entitled to set her own priorities, and I readily concede that her steadfast focus
on gender-based violence has helped to change the way such violence is
understood in law, both domestically and internationally. At the same time, her
insistence on characterizing violence as discrimination has the effect of framing
39. Sometimes MacKinnon is criticized for her emphasis on sexual violence to the exclusion of a
more affirmative conception of women's sexuality. See, e.g., CAUGHT LOOKING: FEMINISM,
PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP 4-8 (Kate Ellis et al. eds., 1992); LISA DUGGAN & NAN D. HUNTER,
SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 30-78 (10th ed. 1995); Lisa Duggan, The Sex
Panic: Women, Censorship, and "Pornography ": An Historical Overview, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 25,
28-31 (1993); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001). At other times, she is criticized for her focus on sexual violence to the
exclusion of other forms of discrimination. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) (criticizing MacKinnon's dominance analysis for
overemphasizing the sexual component of workplace harassment).
40. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 130-31. MacKinnon's description of the
role of family structure in women's inequality is representative of her tendency to prioritize issues of
violence. In a paragraph focusing on the family as a site of battery and murder, she adds, almost as an
aside, "[t]he family is also a place where women are required to take responsibility for children and are
often given few resources to care for them and little voice in decisions that affect their joint lives." Id.
41. She often includes them in a list of oppressive conditions under which women live. See, e.g., id.
at 42 (sex segregation in the labor force), id. at 131 (describing women's subordination within the
family). Moreover, in her introduction, MacKinnon explains, "[b]ecoming human.., requires
prohibiting or otherwise delegitimating all acts by which human beings as such are violated,
guaranteeing people what they need for a fully human existence, and then officially upholding those
standards and delivering on those entitlements." Id. at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 120-38.
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that violence as a source, rather than a product, of gender hierarchy. 43 Within
that frame, the logical response is to target the violence directly, either through
the criminal law or, more often here, a civil remedy against the abuser.44 Yet
even if one accepts that ending violence must be a top priority, attending to
other culturally-specific dimensions of gender subordination is critical to
understanding why violence happens and to developing policies that will be
effective in curtailing it.
45
For example, in recent work on customary law in South Africa,46 I
interviewed dozens of women and men regarding issues of community control
and leadership, property ownership and inheritance, care and control of
children, and gender-based violence, domestic and otherwise. These interviews
emphasized for me the complex reasons for women's marginalization and lack
of power in their communities, especially the fact that women are not regarded
as part of the lineage that determines leadership, power, and wealth.47 This
family structure, in turn, has important implications for understanding why
domestic violence happens and what kinds of legal structures might be most
effective in curtailing it.
Customary law and social practices create complex pressures and
incentives for women confronted with domestic violence. For example, in the
patrilineal and patrilocal communities with whom we worked, the spouses
reside in the husband's community and the children are regarded as part of their
43. See id. at 107-08 ("The misogyny animating sexual violence is recognized as a mainspring of
the inequality on the basis of sex that destroys our lives .... "); id. at Ill (expressing the belief that
"[w]hen all the forms of violence against women in society, and impunity for it in law, are recognized as
sex inequality violations, law will be made new in women's hands").
44. See id. at 32-33 (noting that "if battering is a social problem of sex inequality, its legal solution
should lie through sex equality law" and advocating a civil remedy); id. at 111 (citing the example of her
antipornography ordinance as a model for civil remedies for sexual violence).
45. For over two decades, feminist legal scholars have produced a great deal of excellent work on
the causes and consequences of domestic violence. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000) (exploring some of the challenges of developing effective
feminist responses to domestic violence and emphasizing the interrelatedness of women's rights claims
to be free of violence with reproductive rights, employment, child care, and economic and social rights).
46. In May 2006, Professor Paolo Galizzi, Professor Catherine Powell, Ziona Tanzer, and I, along
with a group of eight students, completed a year-long research project on the status of women living
under customary law and Muslim personal laws. The project culminated in two weeks of intensive
fieldwork during which we interviewed more than a hundred men and women. The citations to interview
notes that follow are drawn from this project. A complete report of the project will be published in the
Fordham International Law Journal.
47. In the Eastern Cape, this point was illustrated starkly by the arrangement of people within a
round meeting hall where we conducted interviews. All of the men sat on one side (in chairs) and all of
the women on the other (on wooden benches), except for one woman who sat with the men. We asked
why she was sitting on the "men's" side, and she explained to us that she was an unmarried daughter of
the chief. The married women sat on the opposite side because they were not of the lineage. The women
who were part of the lineage (daughters of the chief, for example), left the community when they
married. The arrangement was a production of segregation by blood ties, and in patrilocal communities,
this was also, by default, segregation by gender. See also T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH
AFRICA 347 (2004) (describing women as "transient members of this lineage" and therefore not entitled
to inherit from their husbands).
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48father's family line. This arrangement increases a woman's vulnerability to
violence in a number of ways. First, all married women in the community are
outsiders in that they are not a part of the bloodline and are therefore
marginalized to some degree.49 Yet, the first source from whom a woman is
expected to seek help in the event of violence is her husband's family.
50
Second, although she may find some measure of security with them,5 1 if she
chooses to leave her husband's community, she must leave her children and her
property. 52 To complicate matters further, even if she is willing to leave under
these terms, her own family may not welcome her back because they may be
forced to return the lobolo, or bridewealth, which they may be unwilling or
unable to do.
53
In these communities, therefore, customary law operates to disempower
women economically, socially, and politically in ways that are far-reaching,
deeply-rooted, and complex. In cases of domestic violence, it creates
tremendous pressure to resolve matters within the family or to endure the
abuse. 54 This social structure means that women will not necessarily be able or
even willing to invoke available remedies for domestic violence. In interviews
with NGO representatives working on domestic violence in South Africa and
police charged with responding to such complaints, we learned that incidents
48. See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 180-81, 309 (describing the patrilineal family and the affiliation
of children with the husband's lineage).
49. See id. at 180-81.
50. See id. at 250.
51. One traditional leader, Chief Ngangomhlaba Mathanzima, the Head Chief of the House of
Traditional Leaders in Bisho, Eastern Cape, explained that the extended family will consult and often
recognize the problems. He suggested that the suspicion is often on the man, who is encouraged to move
out and leave the woman to care for the home and children. Interview with Ngangomhlaba Mathanzima,
Head Chief, House of Traditional Leaders, in Bisho, S. Afr. (May 24, 2006) (notes on file with author).
52. This is generally the case unless the children are very young. If so, she may leave with them,
but must return them when they reach an appropriate age. For example, the Subheadman of the Xhosa
village of Ngcengane in the Eastern Cape, M. Similo, explained to us that, if a woman leaves, she must
leave the children with the man's family. If they are very young, she may take them but must return
them when they are older. Interview with M. Similo, Subheadman, in Ngcengange, S.Afr. (May 26,
2006) (notes on file with author). See also BENNETT, supra note 47, at 285 (noting that "parental rights
are determined by payment of lobolo [bridewealth]").
53. For example, in Ngcengane, Subheadman M. Similo explained the process for the dissolution of
marriage. He insisted that there was no divorce in his court. Rather, when the woman decides to leave
the man, the family of the woman must retrieve her. She then stands naked outside the kraal of her
family, where the cattle are kept, and must drive the cattle from the kraal to return the lobolo. Interview
with M. Similo, supra note 51.
54. One of the members of the House of Traditional Leaders in Bisho, Eastern Cape, explained to
us that customary law is conciliatory. Even in the case of domestic violence, the family will be brought
together to settle the dispute. Interview with Nkosi T. Magadla, Chief, House of Traditional Leaders, in
Bisho, S. Aft. (May 24, 2006) (notes on file with author). Lungiswa Mamela, a woman working at the
Women's Centre in Khayelitsha, explained that women must simply endure the abuse. Indeed, women
are taught to expect a certain level of abuse as a condition of marriage. Interview with Lungiswa
Mamela, Women's Centre, in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, S. Afr. (May 28, 2006) (notes on file with
author).
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are formally reported only in the most severe cases.55 The state's legal
mechanism for responding to domestic violence is rarely invoked, even when
an initial report is made.
56
This evidence suggests that fashioning appropriate policy responses to
domestic violence requires an understanding of the complex structure of
patriarchy in a given culture, including issues of educational inequality,
economic dependence, gendered religious and cultural norms, and hierarchical
family structures. In the communities with whom we worked, simply adding to
existing remedies a civil cause of action against one's abuser for damages or an
injunction, as MacKinnon advocates, is not likely to improve significantly the
situation of women. Rather, educational efforts aimed at local leaders and the
creation of local support networks among women may be more effective. Law
reform efforts might more profitably target the issue of lobolo, providing that in
cases of spousal abuse, it need not be returned.
57
None of this contradicts MacKinnon's theoretical claim that violence is
important, even central, to women's subordination. It simply suggests that
doing what MacKinnon demands-taking seriously sexual violence and ending
it-will require understanding and addressing a more complex dynamic of
patriarchy that extends well beyond the problem of gender-based violence
itself.
Another reason that MacKinnon's relative inattention to issues of gender
inequality other than sexual violence is unfortunate is that the one essay in the
volume that does engage them, the chapter analyzing the issue of personal laws
under the constitution of India, does so in characteristically interesting and
productive ways. 58 In that essay, MacKinnon extends her critique of the
Aristotelian conception of equality-perhaps her most important contribution
to legal thought59-to the equality jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India.
She praises the Court for embracing a comparatively robust and substantive
definition of equality but notes its failure to extend the principle to the context
of Hindu personal laws.60 This discussion takes MacKinnon into the thorny
area of patriarchal religious practices. In her thoughtful discussion, she
acknowledges the problems, both practical and ethical, of imposing a legal
55. See Interview with N.P. Ngum, South African Police Service Captain, in Coffee Bay, Eastern
Cape, S. Aft. (May 27, 2006) (notes on file with author) (explaining that most cases of domestic
violence are not reported and, if they are reported, charges are not pursued by the accuser).
56. See id. (noting that occasionally an order of protection is sought, but the victim almost never
pursues the case, and the man is almost never prosecuted).
57. See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 277-78 (describing conditions under which lobolo need not be
returned upon dissolution of marriage); Interview with Sibongile Ndashe, Women's Legal Centre, in
Cape Town, S. Aft. (May 28, 2006) (notes on file with author) (describing a case involving a king where
domestic violence is being raised as a defense to the return of lobolo after the dissolution of marriage).
58. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 120-38.
59. See MACKiNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 19, at 215-34.
60. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 128.
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structure on a non-consenting community, particularly one that itself is
subordinated within the broader culture.
61
This analysis of personal laws, despite its elegance, illustrates a second
limitation of the book as a whole: the centrality of legal regulation to
MacKinnon's analysis of and response to inequality. Simply put, despite her
occasional insistence to the contrary, MacKinnon is quite optimistic about the
liberatory potential of law.62 Thus, in the face of a patriarchal social structure
buttressed by religious beliefs, MacKinnon's solution is for women to be able
to sue to opt out of such a regime. 63 Yet the usefulness of new legal remedies
varies dramatically depending on the power and resources of the individual
woman. Although the framework she proposes would give women who are
already capable of seeking legal remedies a choice that they do not currently
have, it is not likely to do much in the short or even medium term to improve
the status of more marginalized women living under personal laws.
Again, consider an example from South Africa. When confronted with a
similar conflict between constitutional principles and customary law, the South
African Constitutional Court reached a result very different from the Indian
Supreme Court. In Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha,64 the Court considered a
constitutional challenge to the customary norm of male primogeniture. In that
case, the widow and the deceased had lived together for twelve years. They had
two children, both girls.65 The husband had been a carpenter, and the wife was
a domestic worker.66 "They were poor and lived in a temporary informal shelter
in Cape Town.' 67 The deceased had obtained a state housing subsidy that had
allowed him to purchase the property on which they lived and to buy materials
with which to build a house. 68 But "he died before the house could be built.,
69
The estate consisted of the temporary shelter where Bhe continued to live with
her youngest daughter, the land upon which it was built, the household chattel,
and the building materials. 70 The magistrate ruled for the deceased's father,
invoking the rule of male primogeniture under customary law.7 1 Because the
two children were daughters, the magistrate named the deceased's father as the
61. Id. at 134.
62. For example, she warns, "[t]he law, as you know, as all women know, is not ours. It is
treacherous. It is slow." Id. at 103. But then she continues, "[i]t also should not be let off the hook. It
promises you equality. Get it. It is too powerful to be ignored." Id. at I11.
63. Id. at 135-36.
64. Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Aft.).




69. Id. at 15-16.
70. Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1, 15-16 (S. Afr.).
71. Id.
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heir and successor.72 The father, in turn, planned to sell the property to pay for
funeral expenses.
73
To make a long and complex analysis rather short and simple, the
Constitutional Court had relatively little problem concluding that the Black
Administration Act, which dictated the application of customary law on the
basis of race,7" was an unconstitutional, overtly racist legacy of apartheid.75
The Justices then confronted the question of whether customary law should
nevertheless govern the disposition of the estate. Under the South African
Constitution, courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable,
subject to the Bill of Rights.76 The Court then considered whether the
applicable customary law principle of male primogeniture violated women's
rights to equality and to dignity. The Court concluded that it did and, moreover,
that the violation could not be justified under the limitations clause.77
The Constitutional Court thus went further even than MacKinnon would,
78striking down the customary law norm altogether. The Court was admittedly
72. Id.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 91. The Black Administration Act of 1927 specified that the property of "a Black" [for
which the Constitutional Court now substitutes "African"] who dies intestate shall devolve in terms of
"Black law and custom." Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 s. 23. All other estates were governed by
the Intestate Succession Act, which codified and updated common law rules for intestate succession,
providing for inheritance by the surviving spouse and, importantly for this case, providing equally for all
children regardless of birth order or the marital status of the parents. See Intestate Succession Act 81 of
1987.
75. As Justice Langa explained:
Section 23 [of the Black Administration Act] cannot escape the context in which it was
conceived. It is part of an Act which was specifically crafted to fit in with notions of
separation and exclusion of Africans from the people of "European" descent .... What the
Act in fact achieved was to become a cornerstone of racial oppression, division and conflict
within South Africa, the legacy of which will still take years to completely eradicate.
Bhe, 2005 (1) BCLR at 23.
76. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides:
Section 30: Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of
their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any
provision of the Bill of Rights.
Section 31: (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be
denied the right, with other members of that community, to (a) enjoy their culture, practise
their religion and use their language; and (b) ... (2) This right may not be exercised in a
manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
Section 211(3): The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to
the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 at s. 30, s. 31, s. 211(3).
77. Bhe, 2005 (I) BCLR at 33. Under the South African Constitution, once the Court concluded
that the rule of male primogeniture was unfair discrimination on the basis of gender and therefore a
violation of Section 9(3) of the Bill of Rights, it had to consider further whether that violation could be
justified under the limitations clause, Section 36(1), in view of the customary successor's duty of
support. With respect to this analysis, Justice Langa concluded simply that "the connection between the
rules of succession in customary law and the heir's duty to support the dependents of the deceased is, at
best, less than satisfactory .... The heir's duty to support cannot, in the circumstances, constitute
justification for the serious violation of rights." Id.
78. MacKinnon suggests only creating a scheme under which the woman could opt out of the
regime of personal laws. See MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 135-36.
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gentle on customary law, pointing out that the rigidity of the statutory scheme
of apartheid and the racist ends served by the codification of customary law
undermined its flexibility and capacity to evolve as social norms changed over
time-thus implying, at least, that it is more patriarchal than it might have
been.79 In any case, the Court struck it down, and held that the (now) gender-
neutral Intestate Succession Act, which governed the estates of whites, would
apply pending a legislative response.
In one sense, this was an important legal victory for women's equality in
the face of patriarchal custom. It is nevertheless worth asking whether it has
made a real difference to women living under customary law. And we did ask.
Our interviews with South African lawyers and representatives of
nongovernmental organizations working on gender equality issues suggest that
the case has had virtually no impact even on the adjudication of disputes
concerning inheritance rights.80 Although legal services organizations have
begun to conduct training sessions for lawyers and magistrates on a limited
basis, most estates are still administered informally by family members or
traditional leaders in rural and semi-urban communities, where knowledge of
the Bhe decision is virtually nonexistent. As a practical matter, this means that
a widow's access to her deceased husband's home and property depends on the
inclinations of the male heir.82 If that heir is her son, she will likely remain in
her home. If the heir is another male relative, she may well be evicted from the
property, particularly if she has no children of her own. 83 In short, looking
79. Justice Langa explained:
At a time when the patriarchal features of Roman-Dutch law were progressively being
removed by legislation, customary law was robbed of its inherent capacity to evolve in
keeping with the changing life of the people it served, particularly of women. Thus
customary law as administered failed to respond creatively to new kinds of economic activity
by women, different forms of property and household arrangements for women and men, and
changing values concerning gender roles in society. The outcome has been formalisation and
fossilisation of a system which by its nature should function in an active and dynamic
manner.
Bhe, 2005 (1) BCLR at 31-32.
80. See, e.g., Interview with R.B. Mqeke, Professor, Rhodes University, in Grahamstown, S. Afr.
(May 23, 2006) (stating that the government has failed "to explain the changes that have taken place.
Nothing has been done. People live as if there were no Bhe. People don't know about it.") (notes on file
with author).
81. For example, Patrick Pringle, the Director of the Queenstown Rural Legal Centre, noted that,
when the Centre undertook its training efforts, even the paralegals were unaware of the Bhe judgment.
Where there was awareness, he added, there had been almost a paralytic effect. The magistrates did not
know how to apply the judgment. The problem was not resistance but ignorance of the judgment. See
Interview with Patrick Pringle, Director, Queenstown Rural Legal Centre, in Grahamstown, S. Afr.
(May 23, 2006) (notes on file with author).
82. See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 335 (stating that the "heirs must be male, partly because only
men have the legal powers necessary [to] run a family's affairs, but also because the bloodline is traced
through males").
83. Bennett observes that the widow's right to maintenance depends on her willingness to remain
on the homestead and that the successor has no right to eject her. See id. at 347-48. He concedes,
however, that "[c]ompliance with support obligations depends, in the first instance, on harmonious
relationships." Id. at 349. The vulnerability of the widow was confirmed by our interviews. See, e.g.,
Interview with Mbolompo community members, in Eastern Cape, S. Aft. (May 25, 2006) (noting that a
2006]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
beyond the opinion itself to consider the conditions on the ground suggests that
very little power has been redistributed as a result of this legal victory.
I do not mean to suggest that the Constitutional Court's decision does not
matter; it does. Surely South African women living under customary law are
better off than they would have been if the Court had taken the Indian Supreme
Court's approach and exempted such laws from the Constitution's guarantee of
gender equality. But they are not substantially and materially better off as a
result. For that to happen, women must not only have a legal right to own and
inherit property, but also a means of obtaining and controlling the property.
For many women in the developing world, this means not having the primary
(or often sole) responsibility for feeding their children every day. Women
cannot expand their economic power if they cannot think beyond the next meal
for their families. For women who have acquired such resources, the law can
help them keep their resources and pass them on to their daughters. It cannot
change their economic status in the first place.
In short, law matters, but perhaps not as much as MacKinnon suggests.
Legal reform is a necessary but far from sufficient factor in the progress toward
gender equality on a global level. For lawyers and law professors to assume
otherwise (which too many of us do) is to exaggerate our own significance in
the larger struggle.
MacKinnon's faith in the liberatory potential of law and her resulting
embrace of an ambitious law reform agenda is perhaps surprising given her
longstanding critique of law as an instrument of state power and of the state as
thoroughly masculine. 84 In some of her earliest work, MacKinnon argues that
the state is fully complicit in the construction of gender hierarchy: "The liberal
state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of
men as a gender, through its legitimizing norms, relation to society, and
substantive policies." 85 She goes on to show how the state accomplishes this, in
part, through law, embracing a false norm of equality that reinforces and
obscures male dominance. Thus, for MacKinnon, borrowing from Marx, the
liberal state and its regulation through law is a ruse of power disguised as
gender neutrality-most oppressive when it is most neutral.86
Are Women Human? extends this analysis to the international sphere,
asking: "If the state has a gender (as well as usually a sex), so that the state
through its distinctive instrument, law, sees and treats women the way men in
society see and treat women, does international law challenge this, or does it
widow often does not get what is due to her, especially if the man had another relationship that resulted
in the birth of children) (notes on file with author).
84. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 19;
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,
8 SIGNS 635 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, SIGNS 1I].
85. MacKinnon, SIGNS It, supra note 84, at 644.
86. See MacKinnon, SIGNS II, supra note 84 (making this point more explicitly here than in later
work).
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reproduce it at a yet higher level? '87 Her answer, for the most part, is that the
international legal order does reproduce gender hierarchy, largely through an
embrace of states as the relevant units of power and obligation. 88 As she
explains:
[T]his statist structure of international human rights.., means that no
state has an incentive to break ranks with states as such by moving to
set a human rights standard for women's status and treatment that no
state yet meets within itself or (seems to) want to be held to
internationally.
89
With this diagnosis of the function of law in the liberal state and the state-
centered international system, MacKinnon might be left with little to do,
concluding that trying to combat inequality through law is misguided and
doomed to failure. This has not been her response. Instead, shifting from critic
to reformer, she has attempted to fashion a feminist law reform agenda that
seeks to disrupt the masculinity of law (its supposed neutrality) and make it
responsive to gender inequality, as Wendy Brown has observed, by "installing
within the law the capacity to recognize stratifying social power.' 90 In other
words, MacKinnon does not simply reject the liberal promise of equality as
obfuscating the material conditions of subordination. Instead, she argues that in
order for that promise to be realized, the law must not only take into account
the substantive conditions of women's subordination, but also help to alter
those conditions.
The logic of the argument is seductive: Liberalism ignores women's
subordination by emphasizing the danger of state power and protecting, in the
name of freedom, the very site of women's subordination. MacKinnon's
response is to invoke state power to disrupt and reallocate private power
through law and, if necessary, through force. The problem, though, is that
liberals are not wrong about what we should fear about state power: It is
difficult to control, subject to abuse, and profoundly threatening to individual
freedom. In short, if liberals err by ignoring the dangers of private power,
MacKinnon errs by ignoring the dangers of public power.
MacKinnon herself is evidently a bit uncomfortable with invoking state
power in this way, at one point characterizing the state as "increasingly
irrelevant to women." 9 1 Indeed, one of the virtues she perceives in international
human rights law is that it seeks to hold states accountable to individuals, thus
shifting power from the masculine state to individuals, some of whom are
women. 92 One way to do this is through the time-honored naming and shaming
87. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 4.
88. See id. at 4-7.
89. Id. at 39.
90. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 129 (1995).
91. See MAcKiNNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 13.
92. See id. at 1-2.
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techniques of NGOs. Women can work together across national boundaries in
these non-state, woman-controlled entities to formulate policy and assert their
rights.93 And, as MacKinnon rightly observes, women have made significant
progress in pushing women's rights higher (if not to the top) of the
international human rights agenda, at least on the rhetorical level.94
MacKinnon characterizes this process as "supplementing or even at times
supplanting the state as international law's historically nearly exclusive unit."
95
Yet, ultimately, the effectiveness of this strategy depends upon the willingness
of states to insist upon compliance with international law, something that has
not been forthcoming. This book provides ample evidence of both the embrace
by states and international bodies of a norm of gender equality, and of the
wholesale flouting of that norm. 9 6 Given this reality, MacKinnon must accept
that, no matter how good the legal definition of equality might be, no matter
how fully the Aristotelian concept of equality is repudiated in favor of
substantive equality, the unequal conditions under which women live will not
change without the exercise of state power, something that women do not fully
control.
Caught between needing and distrusting the state, MacKinnon attempts to
hedge by advocating civil remedies rather than criminal ones.97 She argues, for
example, that civil remedies for sexual violence could "put more power in the
hands of women both to confront the state, where necessary, including through
international and national forums, and to directly confront men in society who
harm them." 98 But to regard such remedies as somehow non-state, "private," or
under women's control, is to buy into the public/private distinction feminists
have criticized for so long. Legal norms permitting a civil action and backed by
judicial power are every bit as regulatory as criminal sanctions, and ultimately,
equally dependent on the state for their enforcement.
99
So, what is at stake in this expansion of state power in the name of
women's equality? I have already expressed doubts about the efficacy of law in
93. See id. at 2 ("And since states too often do not represent women, whether by acts or failures to
act within the sphere of their power and authority, women facing unresponsive official mechanisms,
doctrines, and authorities have reached, often through their own NGOs, to hold the law in their own
hands, seeking perpetrator accountability directly to them through civil legal means.").
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id. at 10 ("Many, even most, countries recognize sex equality as a value in their legal systems,
widely guaranteeing legal equality based on sex in constitutions and other foundational statements-this
despite the fact that sex discriminatory laws continue in force around the world in settings of pervasive
social inequality of the sexes in reality.").
97. See, e.g., id. at 118 (discussing civil remedies for pornography).
98. Id. at 33.
99. Thus, for example, MacKinnon's groundbreaking representation of female Croat and Muslim
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina in federal court in the United States, which resulted in a $745 million
verdict for the plaintiffs, is an important symbol, but utterly unenforceable without the exercise of state
power. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra
note 1, at 208 (reporting amount of the judgment).
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bringing about meaningful changes in the material conditions under which
women live. Law has simply not proven itself a very effective tool for the
redistribution of power and resources. At the same time, law inevitably serves
as a tool for the exercise of power, sometimes in ways that are unintended and
unpredictable.100 Thus, as women, indeed feminists, increasingly exercise
power on the national and international levels, we must consider the conditions
under which the power of law can be deployed legitimately. Who are the
dissenters and how are their lives affected? How can specific legal reforms be
structured so as to minimize the possibilities for abuse? How do the legal
changes suggested here alter the risks of such abuse? Who becomes more
vulnerable? Who less? In short, feminists should consider not simply whether
law as an instrument of state power can be effective in empowering women, but
also how that power can be wielded ethically.
MacKinnon devotes very little attention to these questions here. Often she
simplifies the situation by downplaying the costs, especially those borne by
women. Consider, for example, MacKinnon's treatment of sex work. Much
disagreement exists among women, including among feminists, as to whether
sex work is inherently subordinating.' 0 1 Although many feminists support
MacKinnon's position, others have argued that sex work ought not to be
differentiated from other types of work that may be equally dangerous and
demeaning. 10 2 On this view, to single out sex work simultaneously reinforces a
conservative anti-sex morality and draws attention away from a wide range of
workers in need of protection. 
10 3
100. In her critique of what she calls "governance feminism," Janet Halley observes that "punishing
conduct as a crime does not 'stop' or 'end' it, as governance feminists sometimes seem to imagine.
Rather it enables a wide range of specific institutional actors to do a wide range of things." Janet Halley
et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work,
and Sex Trafficking. Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
335,337 (2006).
101. Compare Amber Cooke, Sex Trade Workers and Feminists: Myths and Illusions, in GOOD
GIRLS/BAD GIRLS: FEMINISTS AND SEX TRADE WORKERS FACE TO FACE 202 (Laurie Bell ed., 1987)
[hereinafter GOOD GIRLS/BAD GIRLS] ("Some [women] feel they are victims. Some are victims. And
then there are others who have made that choice and celebrate that choice."); and Jody Freeman, The
Feminist Debate over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes' Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the
(Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1989-90) (discussing conditions under which
women might exert more control over the conditions of sex work), with Dorchen Leidholdt,
Prostitution: A Violation of Women's Human Rights, I CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 133 (1993) (rejecting
the idea that a woman's choice to engage in sex work could be a free one); and Beverley Balos, The
Wrong Way to Equality: Privileging Consent in the Trafficking of Women for Sexual Exploitation, 27
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (2004) (questioning whether consent constitutes a meaningful boundary for
legal regulation of sex work).
102. See, e.g., Norma Jean Almodovar, For Their Own Good: The Results of the Prostitution Laws
as Enforced by Cops, Politicians and Judges, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 123 (1999) (noting that
"there is potential for coercion in any relationship"); Gail Pheterson, The Whore Stigma: Female
Dishonor and Male Unworthiness, 37 Soc. TEXT 39, 54 (1993) (quoting sex workers' experiences of
empowerment through economic independence).
103. See Carlin Meyer, Decriminalizing Prostitution: Liberation or Dehumanization?, 1 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 105, 117 (1993) (calling into question the images of sexuality implicit in the anti-
prostitution agenda).
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For her part, MacKinnon has very little patience for these objections and
dismisses them here with characteristic sarcasm.10 4 Somewhat more subtly, she
attempts to avoid them altogether by focusing on sexual experiences that are
incontrovertibly violent while eliding more problematic distinctions, for
example between trafficking and sex work. Thus, in her chapter "Pornography
as Trafficking," she argues that:
[T]o distinguish trafficking from prostitution, as if trafficking by
definition is forced and prostitution by definition is free, is to obscure
that both use money to compel sexual use, that the whole point of sex
trafficking is to deliver women and children into prostitution, and that
not crossing a jurisdictional line does not make the unequal equal or
the forced free. 05
By noting that "[w]omen can be enslaved without ever leaving home,"' 106 she
means to indict the practice of prostitution, whether transnational or not.
Of course, that women can be enslaved does not mean that they are
enslaved or regard themselves as such. For many feminists, though perhaps not
for MacKinnon, this distinction matters. Some feminists working on behalf of
sex workers, and some sex workers themselves, view the restriction of
women's voluntary participation in this work as limiting women's freedom.
0 7
MacKinnon dismisses this either as impossible (what woman with choices
would voluntarily engage in sex work?), or perhaps affecting so few women as
to be worth the cost.' 8 Whether MacKinnon thinks that women who defend sex
work as a viable economic choice are deluded (suffering from false
consciousness, perhaps) or simply have so few choices that this one need not be
respected is unclear. If the former, MacKinnon does not explain how she
identifies the falsely conscious (or worse, collaborating) woman. 109 If the latter,
104. See MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 249 ("[t]hrowing money at victims
of sexual abuse does not make it a job").
105. Id. at 250.
106. Id.
107. See Holly B. Fechner, Three Stories of Prostitution in the West: Prostitutes' Groups, Law, and
Feminist "Truth," 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 26 (1994) (describing the agenda of empowerment of sex
workers embraced by groups such as the Red Thread, International Committee for Prostitutes' Rights
and COYOTE (an acronym for "Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics")).
108. See MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 115 ("Most women in pornography,
if they are not directly abducted, are poor, desperate, addicted to drugs, sexually abused as children, or
are children. If spreading your legs for a camera is a woman's autonomous choice, as the myth goes,
wouldn't you think that the women with the most choices rather than the fewest, with the most
preconditions for autonomy rather than the least, would be the women doing it?"). She also expressly
rejects any distinction between children and adult women: "To purport to address child sexual
exploitation while doing nothing effective for adult women is to suppose that an age line is enforceable
on, or respected by, an industry that is organized to exploit the powerless, and to accept the false notion
that women become equal at age eighteen." Id. at 250.
109. One reason that this distinction is unclear is that MacKinnon does not directly associate this
pro-sex work position with women. She attacks it as an abstract argument, but not as the personal
experience of individual women. She therefore never has to say directly that any particular woman is
wrong about her account of her own experiences. In contrast, she does quote extensively from women
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it is not obvious why it is better for women with few choices to have their
preferred choice eliminated in favor of even more dangerous, difficult, and
poorly-paid work. What is clear is that, for MacKinnon, no form of work could
be more degrading or exploitative than sex work. l 1° Yet, if another woman
makes a different, albeit constrained, choice, what is the justification for
overriding it?' 11
I do not mean to suggest that the law must invariably accept an individual's
own assessment of what might be best for her. But given our long history of
protective labor legislation reinforcing the economic marginalization of
women,1 2 it is worth asking when women's choices are sufficiently free that
they should be respected by the law. If for MacKinnon the answer in the case of
sex work is "never," she must justify (or at least acknowledge) the coercive
power that judgment brings to bear on those women who choose differently.
Maybe the benefits to all women are worth the costs, but MacKinnon seems to
count costs only on one side.
MacKinnon encounters the problem of conflicts among women again in
her chapter on personal laws. Here, she addresses the question more directly.
Indeed, she comes close to acknowledging that some women might prefer to
conform their lives to their own understandings of religious obligation, even if
inegalitarian, and that those preferences might have to be respected.' 13
Embracing the liberal proxy for freedom, individual choice, MacKinnon's
solution is to provide women with the opportunity to elect either the
who have been abused in the course of sex work, including in the production of pornography. See, e.g.,
id. at 18-19 (quoting Linda Marchiano's account of her abuse during the filming of Deep Throat).
110. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, I MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13,
13 (1993) (arguing that "[w]omen in prostitution are denied every imaginable civil right.., such that it
makes sense to understand prostitution as consisting in the denial of women's humanity, no matter how
humanity is defined").
11l. To dismiss the positive accounts of sex work is simply to ignore women's experiences to the
extent that they conflict with one's political ends. This seems especially problematic for MacKinnon
given that her methodological approach is premised on the development of legal norms and policy based
on women's experiences. See MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 46. As members of
one Canadian organization of sex workers explained:
[W]hen you have a prostitute that says, "Well, I don't agree with the way you're interpreting
my life, I don't feel oppressed or I don't feel exploited in the way that you're saying," they
say things like, "She's too blinded by her own oppression to see her experience for what it
really is .... [T]hey wouldn't dare be so condescending or patronizing with any other group
of women.
Realistic Feminists: An Interview with Valerie Scott, Peggy Miller, and Ryan Hotchkiss of the Canadian
Organization for the Rights of Prostitutes, in GOOD GIRLS/BAD GIRLS, supra note 101, at 213.
112. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
113. MacKinnon does not seem to think that those choices are entitled to respect as an ethical
matter. Rather, she characterizes the outright invalidation of all sex-discriminatory aspects of personal
laws as "preferable on principle but apparently politically inexpedient," suggesting that giving women
the choice of applicable law is an unfortunate but necessary political compromise, rather than a
balancing of competing values. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 135.
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community norm embodied in the personal laws or a legal standard reflecting
substantive gender equality."1
4
MacKinnon also acknowledges here that women's choices will be
constrained by social circumstances and that determining when those choices
are sufficiently free to be respected legally poses a difficult problem."
15
Although elsewhere in this volume she is quite critical of feminist attempts to
theorize the concept of agency," 6 MacKinnon is confronted here with precisely
that issue-the exercise of choice under conditions of inequality. 1 17 Yet, instead
of grappling directly with the difficult problem of whether the law should
respect or override women's choices, MacKinnon simply avoids it by treating
as remote the possibility that a woman would elect to be constrained by
personal laws rather than be governed by the uniform code she proposes.l11
By focusing on her treatment of dissenting women, these examples
illustrate MacKinnon's tendency to disregard or minimize the coercive
consequences of her law reform agenda. This tendency becomes even more
problematic when she invokes the deployment of state power through military
force, as opposed to the force of law, a point illustrated most dramatically by
the final chapter of the book, "Women's September 11 th." On one level, this
chapter can be read simply as an effort to point out once again the hypocrisy of
the international community in responding forcefully and creatively to the
September 11 th attacks when comparable numbers of women are victims of
systematic violence every day. "The fact that Al Qaeda is not organized into a
nation with armies and territory did not stop this international response before it
started," MacKinnon notes. 119 Why is the international community incapable of
responding to the assault on women in a similarly creative way?
Nevertheless, despite her acknowledgement that the "war on terror" is
perhaps "not a model for emulation,"'' 20 MacKinnon does seem to call for a
more directly parallel response. For example, she quotes President Bush's
linking of Al Qaeda to particular states: "We will make no distinction between
the terrorists who committed these acts, and those who harbor them. ' She
then notes that:
114. Id.
115. Id. at 137.
116. See id. at 55 (dismissing this analysis).
117. Professor Kathryn Abrams has done the most sustained and important work on women's
exercise of self-direction or agency under conditions of constraint. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, From
Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999);
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
304, 309 (1995) (noting that dominance feminists characterize "women's sexuality primarily as a
construct of oppressive forces").
118. See MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 1, at 137.
119. Id. at 268.
120. Id. at 260.
121. Id. at 268.
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whether violent men whose targets are women, who operate with
essential impunity worldwide, will be seen as "harbored" by the states
that effectively permit, hence condone and support, their acts, or
whether male violence against women will ever be regarded as urgent
enough to ignore--or preferably restructure-international law to
address it, remains to be seen.
Violence against women, she observes "has yet to create what is perceived
as a humanitarian emergency or to justify military intervention." 123 And more
ominously, "It is so far never suggested that brutal systematic violence against
women, even with official impunity or participation, could legally justify resort
to force unless it occurs as part of a conflagration in which men are also
attacking other men."
' 124
MacKinnon does make that suggestion here. Although she carefully notes
that "[t]his is not to argue that the war on terror is the right model for opposing
violence against women, ' 125 she does suggest the possibility of an international
convention on violence against women that, "when breached, could ultimately
trigger corrective intervention by transnational forces.' ' t 26 She acknowledges
that "real difficulties will have to be faced," but does not elaborate here as to
what those difficulties might be or how we should go about facing them. 127
And yet as I write this, devastation in Iraq, ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan, and the controversial aggrandizement of presidential power under
this "war President" appear to be the principal legacies of the war on terror.
The hoped-for increase in national security seems not to have materialized.
Indeed, in the view of many, the threat of terror has increased. Under these
circumstances, I cannot help thinking that the expansion of legal grounds for
armed intervention may not be the right direction for feminism's international
human rights agenda. Even from the standpoint of women alone, the use of
military force almost always makes things worse, at least in the short term. I do
not deny that it is also sometimes necessary. But, for feminists, the appropriate
lesson of the "war on terror" is not the one MacKinnon would draw, that is, that
if the international community can justify force in Iraq and Afghanistan, so
should it in the analogous circumstances for women. Rather, the lesson may be
that the use of force even in the name of ending terror against civilians can-
indeed will-be abused. Knowing this, perhaps as women, as feminists, our
approach can be different.
122. Id. at 269.
123. Id. at 271.
124. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 275.
126. Id. at 276.
127. Id. at 276-77.
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In the end, the question of women's humanity is not just about whether we
have power, but how we use it. How might women seize power directly or use
law to force states to deploy power on our behalf? What does it mean for
women to do this? One of the insights that feminist legal theorists borrowed
from postmodemism (about which MacKinnon is so scathing here) 128 is that
there is no innocent exercise of power, and legal norms cannot make it so.
29
The point is not that ethical judgments are impossible or meaningless, but that,
once those judgments are made and enforced through law or military
intervention against non-consenting people, the powerful must take
responsibility for the resulting violence. If the powerful includes women,
feminists must think carefully about this responsibility before heeding
MacKinnon's provocative call. After all, the taking of responsibility by the
powerful is ideally what international human rights law, and perhaps even
feminism, is about.
128. See id. at 44-63. I should acknowledge that I am one of many feminists friendly to
postmodemism that MacKinnon criticizes in the chapter cited. I have not pursued that conversation here,
however, as I believe that it is related only tangentially to the central argument of her book and of this
Review.
129. Wendy Brown makes the point this way:
Surrendering epistemological foundations means giving up the ground of specifically moral
claims against domination---especially the avenging of strength through moral critique of
it-and moving instead into the domain of the sheerly political: "wars of position" and
amoral contests about the just and the good in which truth is always grasped as coterminous
with power, as always already power, as the voice of power.
BROWN, supra note 90, at 45. See also Jane Flax, The End of Innocence, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE
POLITICAL 458 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds. 1992) (urging feminists to "take responsibility for
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I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, feminism and contract law seem to occupy different realms.
Feminism seeks to distinguish women from doormats,1 while contract law
provides theory and doctrine for state enforcement of certain kinds of promises.
But the two realms overlap more than many people realize.2 In particular, both
are fundamentally concerned with consent and agency. Having the capacity to
contract-to freely order one's affairs-has been a benchmark for
distinguishing full citizens from everyone else. Since much of feminism is
about women becoming citizens through contract and other means, some
feminists embrace contractarianism as a mechanism and reflection of
empowerment. 3 Other feminists are skeptical about whether most women
1. Describing the traditional goals of feminism in a single sentence, let alone a clause, is difficult.
Feminists disagree on many issues, including whether gender is innate or socially constructed and
whether law and society should treat men and women the same or account for women's particular life
experiences, such as primary responsibility for child care. A century ago Rebecca West coined the
doormat comparison to provide an overarching, if arch, description of feminism: "I myself have never
been able to find out precisely what Feminism is: I only know that people call me a Feminist whenever I
express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat or a prostitute." Rebecca West, Mr. Chesterton
in Hysterics: A Study in Prejudice, THE CLARION, Nov. 14, 1913, reprinted in YOUNG REBECCA:
WRITINGS OF REBECCA WEST 5 (Jane Marcus ed., 1989).
2. Some contracts scholars have explored interconnections between feminism and contract law.
See, e.g., MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 53-125 (1992); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK,
THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 51 (1993); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT:
SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 98-120 (1981); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 16, 33, 40-41 (1991); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist
Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1992); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of
Choice: A Feminist Perspective on The Limits of Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337
(1996); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70
CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 309; Kellye Y. Testy, An
Unlikely Resurrection, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 219 (1995). Legal historians have weighed in as well. See,
e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century,
107 YALE L.J. 1885 (1998). In the wake of the landmark surrogacy decision In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988), a wide variety of scholars analyzed the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 28-29 (1988); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 86 (1989);
Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 147-48
(1990); June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy
Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 592 (1988); Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in
Surrogate Motherhood: An Illumination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 515 (1990).
3. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998);
VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of
Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); Martha M. Ertman, What's
Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1,
35-42 (2003); Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface to RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION:
CASES AND READINGS IN LAW & CULTURE I (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005); Jill
Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005); Carol M. Rose,
Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421 (1992); Shultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage, supra note 2; Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood,
supra note 2; Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women 's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 81 (1997).
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possess the bargaining power essential to making a deal work for all
4
concerned. Linda Mulcahy and Sally Wheeler's book Feminist Perspectives on
Contract Law5 enters this discussion by tracking some ways that contract law
has played a role in women's struggle for citizenship, and offers a point of
departure to discuss cases commonly studied in law school contracts classes.
Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law makes its contribution to this
endeavor with a largely British set of essays. The essays range widely,
including grand theory, case crunching, and legal archaeology. 6 Of particular
interest are the British spousal-guarantee cases, which shed light on American
cases such as Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 7 In re Baby M,8 and Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.9 Also of interest are chapters demonstrating that
gender lurks where it is least expected. Peter Goodrich's chapter explains how
the postal rule established in Adams v. Lindsell,10 a seemingly gender-neutral
rule dictating that acceptance is effective on the offeree's dispatch, has
gendered roots in that it extends the rule of marital contracting to commercial
contracts. 11 In this light, marital contracts become the template instead of the
exception in contract law, a considerable departure from conventional
wisdom. 12 Other chapters similarly reveal gender cross-currents running
4. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENy. U. L. REV.
1169 (1996); Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (1995); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1403 (2001); sources cited supra note 2 (discussing surrogacy contracts).
5. FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005)
[hereinafter FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES].
6. Legal archaeology investigates the facts behind a particular case to tell the case's back story.
Debora L. Threedy, Legal Archaeology: Excavating Cases, Reconstructing Context, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1197, 1238 (2006). Examples of the genre include Kellye Y. Testy's research on the relational
background of Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, excerpted in RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND DOCTRINE 1003-08 (3d ed. 2003); Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the
Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland
Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucile, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995); A.W.
Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 287 (1989); A.W.B. Simpson, Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke Ball,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1985); Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers Association v.
Domenico, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 185 (2000); and Lea S. Van der Velde, The Gendered Origins of the
Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775 (1992).
7. 212 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that a "widow of 51 years .... [who]
was incessantly subjected to over-reaching blandishment and cajolery" and was "induced" to pay in
excess of $3 1,000 for dance lessons could bring a claim for rescission of the contracts).
8. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), rev'd, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). In this famous
surrogacy case, the New Jersey trial court ordered specific enforcement of the surrogacy contract,
compelling Mary Beth Whitehead to relinquish parental rights and obligations to the child she conceived
and bore pursuant to a surrogacy contract with William Stem. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in contrast, refused to enforce the surrogacy
contract because it conflicted with adoption law and public policy, observing that "[t]here are, in a
civilized society, some things that money cannot buy." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).
9. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
10. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.).
11. Peter Goodrich, The Posthumous Life of the Postal Rule: Requiem and Revival of Adams v.
Lindsell, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 75-89.
12. My students generally find heart balm actions ridiculous, heartily agreeing with states' repeal of
actions such as breach of promise to marry in the early twentieth century.
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through contexts that seem gender-neutral, such as Bela Chatterjee's
contribution, which argues that cyber-contracting provides opportunities for
rethinking contract doctrine,' 3 and Linda Mulcahy's chapter championing
alternative dispute resolution as a means for importing feminist methodologies
to dispute resolution. 14
The British spousal-guarantee cases appear again and again in Feminist
Perspectives, notably Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien,5 a recent statement of the
"special tenderness" doctrine toward married women and other cohabitants in
noncommercial guarantee cases, and Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No.
2), 16 which specifies methods for banks to rebut the presumption of undue
influence in these cases. New to many American readers, these cases involve
wives asserting undue influence, mistake, or misrepresentation to avoid their
guarantees of their husbands' business debts with the goal of preventing the
bank from foreclosing on the family home. This braiding of family and
commerce provides a new context for common contracts class discussions such
as the surrogacy cases' 7 and the classic case defining consideration, Hamer v.
Sidway.18
The spousal-guarantee cases are particularly suited for classroom
discussion because classical contract theory cannot quite resolve the issues they
raise. If parties are autonomous individuals engaged in discrete transactions,
why not enforce a surrogacy contract against Mary Beth Whitehead? 19 Why not
hold an uncle to his promise to give his ne'er-do-well nephew $5000 for.
refraining from the vices of smoke, drink, and gambling?20 The holdings in
these cases turn on the fact that they arise out of complex social relations of
love, duty, and trust. They thus raise questions about the boundaries between
autonomy and altruism, and consequently, between markets and families.
2
1
13. Bela Bonita Chatterjee, Different Space, Same Place? Feminist Perspectives on Contracts in
Cyberspace, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 109. Chatterjee contends that cyberspace, in
addition to being economic, is a political space in which power relations are renegotiated, and further
contends that a postmodern perspective on the fluidity offered by cyberspace enables the refiguring of
gender and other power relationships. Id. at 110-11. She concludes that in this context "law could move
from being a mere framework for commerce to a facilitator ofjustice." Id. at 112.
14. Linda Mulcahy, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Flaws? The Feminisation of Dispute
Resolution, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 141.
15. (1992)4 All E.R. 983 (C.A.).
16. (2001) 4 All E.R. 449, 466-68 (H.L.).
17. Some casebooks begin with surrogacy cases. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 6, at 19, 30, 42
(excerpting In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) and related material). Carol
Sanger uses Baby M to preview the entire contracts class. Carol Sanger, Great Contracts Cases: (Baby)
M Isfor the Many Things: Why I Start with M, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1443 (2000). Other casebooks that
include the surrogacy cases include STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 217 (2d ed.
2001); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 174 (7th ed. 2001); and
AMY HILSMAN KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW 462, 465 (2d ed. 2000).
18. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
19. See Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128.
20. Hamer, 27 N.E. 256.
21. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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Enter relational contract theory. Relational contract theory critiques
classical contract law for its failure to account for the lack of real agreement in
contracts where terms appear in pre-printed forms and bargaining power is
sufficiently unbalanced so that only one party has the power to determine those
terms. In place of the assumptions of autonomy and choice that inform classical
contract theory, relational contract theory offers norms of cooperation and
reciprocity to guide contract theory and practice.
22
As an ongoing venture, spousal contracts are as relational as they get,
which may explain the prominence of both relational contract theory and
spousal-guarantee cases in Feminist Perspectives. In Mulcahy's introduction
she suggests that relational contract theory can import an "ethic of care" they
deem "feminine" to contract law through norms of role integrity, flexibility,
and reciprocity. 23 The close relationship of the cultural feminist goals of
cooperation, trust, and altruism in relational contract theory is widely
24recognized. However, the introductory chapter's insistent contrast of
"feminine values" with "masculine abstracted relations," even with caveats
about social construction, 25 seems a bit two-dimensional in light of anti-
essentialist feminist scholarship of recent years.
26
This talk of gender may sound foreign to most American contracts scholars
and students, since contract doctrine tends to employ gender-neutral analysis,
rarely acknowledging that women might have special interests in contract law.
Judicial recognition of women's special interests might relegate women to
second class citizenship, which would be inconsistent with courts' liberal
commitment to parties' individuality. This respect for individuality and choice,
which contracts theorists call the will theory of contract, 27 forms the foundation
22. See, e.g., IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003); David
Campbell, Introduction to IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 3, 5-11 (David
Campbell ed., 2001).
23. Linda Mulcahy, The Limitations of Love and Altruism-Feminist Perspectives on Contract
Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 1, 13. Relational contract theory materials on which
Mulcahy relies include IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); and Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the
Complexities of Contract, 11 L. & SOC'Y REV 507 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping the Promise of Relational Contract Theory-
"Real" Legal Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 909 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Shultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage, supra note 2, at 301-03; Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored
Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791 (1991); John Wightman,
Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory and the Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUD. 93 (2000).
25. Mulcahy, supra note 23, at 1, 3.
26. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Katherine M. Franke,
The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation ofSexfrom Gender, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1995); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993).
27. Conventional wisdom justifies the legal enforcement of certain promises in contract law on the
grounds that parties voluntarily consented to the terms of the agreement. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 20-21 (2d ed. 1990). A classic example of this approach is CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE (1981). Alternative justifications for legal enforcement of some agreements include economic
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of contract law. It defines courts' job as interpreting and enforcing contracts,
but not revising parties' agreements.2 8 In contrast, English law expresses a
"special tenderness" toward married women in a line of cases that Gillian
Hadfield has dubbed "spousal guarantee cases." These cases, discussed in
several chapters of Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law,29 involve wives
securing their husbands' business debts with the family home, often without
knowing the amount of the debt, that the loan jeopardizes the family home, or
even that they are signing loan documents.30 English courts, expressing a
"special tenderness" 3' to married women as well as those "in a like position,"32
presume undue influence in cases where non-commercial sureties guarantee
debts, and allow lenders to rebut this presumption by showing that the
wives/sureties fully understood and freely consented to guaranteeing their
husbands' business debts.
33
Despite American law's formal commitment to neutrality, many American
contracts teachers are familiar with the way that gender sometimes makes a
difference in contracts cases, albeit less explicitly than in the English spousal-
guarantee cases. American courts and students do not entirely ignore the fact
that Mrs. Vokes was a lonely widow, that Mary Beth Whitehead's surrogacy
contract concerned a service only women can provide, and that Ora Lee
Williams was a poor, African-American mother supporting seven children on
efficiency and distributive justice. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th
ed. 2002); Anthony T. Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404, 411 (1981)
(reviewing FRIED, supra).
28. FRIED, supra note 27, at 2-3. Benjamin Cardozo famously articulated this reason for refusing to
enforce a contract with an ambiguous price term: "We are not at liberty to revise while professing to
construe." Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470, 471 (N.Y.
1923).
29. Rosemary Auchmuty, The Rhetoric of Equality and the Problem of Heterosexuality, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 53, 65 (citing Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien (1992) 4 All E.R.
983, 998-1009 (C.A.) [hereinafter O'Brien I]). Another commentator observes that "[1]aw's gentle
concern and ministrations protect the role of the wife as the guarantor of continuity between generations
and properties." Adam Gearey, Women Lie Back Everywhere. The Symbolic Economy of Restitution, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 91, 98.
30. O'Brien 1, (1992) 4 All E.R. 998-1009; Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2), (2001) 4 All
E.R. 449 (H.L.).
31. Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien, (1993) 4 All E.R. 417, 424 (H.L.) [hereinafter O'Brien 11].
32. Etridge (No. 2), (2001) 4 All E.R. 456. As the court explained in O'Brien II,
[T]his special tenderness of treatment afforded to wives by the courts is properly attributable
to two factors. First, many cases may well [establish] ... undue influence because the wife
demonstrates that she placed trust and confidence in her husband in relation to her financial
affairs and therefore raises a presumption of undue influence. Second, the sexual and
emotional ties between the parties provide a ready weapon for undue influence: a wife's true
wishes can easily be overborne because of her fear of destroying or damaging the wider
relationship between her and her husband.
O'Brien 11 at 424.
33. In cases where the relationship between the debtor and the surety is not commercial (i.e.,
family), banks can rebut the presumption of undue influence by retaining counsel to advise the
wife/surety (1) of the nature and consequences of the loan transaction; (2) of the seriousness of the risks
involved, including the loan amount and the bank's rights to increase the debt or change the terms; (3)
that she has a choice; and (4) to determine whether she wants to proceed with the transaction. Etridge
(No. 2), (2001) 4 All E.R. 470.
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$218 a month.34 Thus the question arises: To what extent do and should wives,
women, and feminine persons generally receive "tender" treatment by contract
law?
This Review tackles this question by using the English spousal-guarantee
cases' assertion of legal "tenderness" to women as a point of departure,
exploring how three possible meanings of "tender" might influence feminist
understandings of contract law:
(1) legal tender, i.e., women's access to cash, or lack thereof;
(2) solicitude toward a particularly vulnerable person, such as a child
(as in the tender years doctrine); and
(3) splitting the word in two to voice an imperative "tend her," which
raises questions of individual responsibility and liability, asking
whether, and when, legal doctrine should and does treat women as
autonomous individuals.
35
Some feminists might blanch at the prospect of legal "tenderness" specially
directed at women. 36 Against this grain, I contend here that a feminist view of
contract law and theory would do well to attend to these three enumerated
senses of "tender."
First, a feminist view should maximize women's access to capital, and thus
to choices in their lives. Second, it should recognize the systemic
vulnerabilities of certain classes of people, in particular dependents and those
who care for them.37 Third, it should strive to recognize the integrity of
individual women, resisting the powerful cultural tendency to subsume women
into relationships (daughter, mother, wife) and deprive them of that crucial
element of citizenship, individual choice. 38 Taken together, these three
concerns account for cultural feminists' attention to the relational roles played
by women, liberal feminists' concerns with autonomy, and material feminists'
concerns about control over the means of production. The fact that the spousal-
guarantee cases raise all three of these issues may explain why they get more
attention than other topics in Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law.
34. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Vokes v. Arthur
Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); In re
Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
35. A fourth meaning of"tender" may spring to contracts scholars' minds. "Tender" also describes
one party to a contract offering or undertaking to perform. Sellers tender goods to buyers, and buyers
tender payment for those goods. This sense of "tender" as "offer" coheres with the spirit of both this
essay and Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law in the sense of making feminism available to contract
theory and doctrine and vice versa.
36. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1247 (1998).
37. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
38. This combination of material concerns, protection of vulnerability, and assertion of
individuality is at least as canonical as Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.). Virginia
Woolf, herself a British feminist, famously asserted that for a woman to write, she needed money and a
room of her own. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 2 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1991) (1929).
2006]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CHECKERED PAST OF GENDER AND RACE IN
CONTRACT LAW
Historically, the legal doctrine of coverture limited married women's
ability to enter or enforce most contracts. Similarly, by not allowing them to
marry, contract doctrine deprived both male and female slaves of the capacity
to contract, placing them in a category with what were then called idiots,
lunatics, and infants. (While terminology has changed, mental disease or defect
and youth still deprive people of contractual capacity, for the most part.)
39
Legislation such as the married women's property acts and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 extended a measure of citizenship to white women as well as people of
color.40 The latter legislation explicitly linked contract and the freedmen's
citizenship by providing that "all persons ... shall have the same right ... to
make and enforce contracts ... as enjoyed by white citizens .... 41 These
doctrinal changes resonated with larger changes in nineteenth-century law,
culture, and politics.
The seismic changes that defined the nineteenth century affected contract
doctrine and contractual aspects of political theory in ways that continue to this
day. Slavery was contested and abolished, marriage was redefined from a
practical institution based on economics and community to a romantic
institution focused on love and companionship, industrialization changed the
ways Americans lived, and the modem welfare state emerged. Contract played
a key role in each of these changes: abolition replaced slavery with wage
labor,42 contract provided a metaphor signaling individuality and choice in
marriage,4 3 contract and commercial law evolved to facilitate industry,44 and
social contract theory provided a rationale for the expansive growth of the
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14-15 (1981).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a) (2000)). One early married women's property act was Ohio's 1809 statue allowing married
women to devise property using wills. 1809 Ohio Laws 146, cited in Sarah Miller Little, A Woman of
Property: From Being It to Controlling It: A Bicentennial Perspective on Women and Ohio Property
Law, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 177, 185 (2005).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) was passed initially as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, then re-enacted
on firmer constitutional footing after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Civil Rights Act
of 1870. For a fuller discussion of the history of § 1981 and citizenship for the freedmen, see Danielle
Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the
Independent Contractor, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 185-87 (2006). Discrimination resting in contract
continues. To remedy it, Congress passed measures such as the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (2000), which prohibits discrimination in credit transactions on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age, provided the applicant has the capacity
to contract. Moreover, employment discrimination claims are often grounded in contract, making § 1981
relevant in those cases. Tarantolo, supra.
42. See, e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE AND
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
43. See, e.g., PETER BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE
LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (1995); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND FAMILY N NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985).
44. See, e.g., William A. Schnader, The New Movement Toward Uniformity in Commercial Law:
The Uniform Commercial Code Marches On, 13 BUS. LAW. 646 (1958).
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welfare state.4 5 In 1864, Sir Henry Maine captured the importance of contract
for these changes, both doctrinally and in terms of political theory, in his now-
famous dictum: "[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been
a movementfrom Status to Contract.
4 6
One strand of political theory has questioned the extent to which women
and other marginalized people have truly been parties to this transition from
Status to Contract. Some feminists, for example, contend that women and
Blacks were left out of the social contract that forms the basis of liberal
political philosophy.47 More concretely, empirical research has demonstrated
that women and people of color get less favorable terms in particular contracts,
such as car sales, than white men.48 If parties do not have equal bargaining
power, contractual consent may not be genuine or complete. 49 Thus, contract
doctrine and theory must account for differences in bargaining power.
Although legal doctrine no longer deprives married women and African
Americans of contractual capacity, legal doctrine drags its disinherited self
behind it by incorporating elements of the old rules in canonical cases.
Recognizing this continued relevance of gender and race in contract doctrine,
albeit in altered form, provides new perspectives on classic contracts cases.
Turning to the present day, it is important to note that contract law already
incorporates much of what editors Mulcahy and Wheeler champion as feminist
approaches. Black-letter doctrine, a mix of law and equity, imports concerns of
justice to complement aims of certainty in basic rules such as the statute of
frauds, the parol evidence rule, and contract modification provisions. The
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) allows considerable flexibility in defining
what constitutes an agreement-the bargain-in-fact between the parties, as
indicated by their words and conduct, course of performance, course of dealing,
and usage of trade.50 Moreover, the U.C.C.'s version of the statute of frauds
provides safe harbors to prevent a party who actually entered into an agreement
from evading its legal enforceability on the grounds that she did not sign a
45. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); BETH A. RUBIN, SHIFTS IN THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT: UNDERSTANDING CHANGE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996); BRIAN SKYMS, EVOLUTION OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996).
46. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (3d ed., H. Holt 1873) (1864).
47. See, e.g., CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 15-
16.
48. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF PACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 44-51.
49. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 15-43, 224-28.
50. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-208 (2003). Course of dealing is conduct between the contracting
parties prior to entering the contract in question, while course of performance is repeated conduct
between parties under contract. Trade usage, in contrast, is practice in the trade or place that parties
justifiably expect will be observed. Id. §§ 1-205, 2-208 (2003). Defining a contract to include
relationship-based evidence of what the parties have done, as opposed to limiting the terms to what they
said they would do in a writing, recognizes the importance of relationships, cooperation, and changed
conditions in contract law.
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document. 5 1 Similarly, the U.C.C. Article 2 parol evidence rule allows even
writings that the parties intend to express their final agreement to be "explained
or supplemented" by course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of
trade, and also by consistent additional terms unless the parties also intended
the writing to be the "complete and exclusive" expression of their agreement.
52
Finally, Article 2's damage provisions create incentives to cooperate by
granting sellers a right to cure nonconforming tender in many circumstances,
53
and by limiting consequential damages to those that cannot be mitigated by
cover or otherwise. 54 In short, contract law already endorses a number of
principles that Mulcahy and Wheeler term feminist.
While these provisions demonstrate that a number of contract doctrines
already recognize interests Mulcahy and Wheeler dub feminist, that insight
leaves a larger question unanswered. We need an understanding of where hard
line contractarian analysis of traditional legal economics becomes subject to the
law of diminishing returns. Claims to individuality and cost-benefit analysis are
helpful, as two generations of legal economic scholarship and case law have
demonstrated. 55 But having a hammer in your hand does not mean that
everything in the world is a nail. Identifying the limits of the classical contract
theory assumptions that form the foundation of legal economic analysis serves
everyone, not just women, and not just feminists. Thinking about "tenderness"
in the three senses of money, solicitude, and independence can help students of
both feminism and contracts rethink their position on contracts, and thus on
legal economic liberal commitments to autonomy, choice, and wealth
maximization.
III. THE THREE SENSES OF "TENDER"
Having made the case for linking contract, citizenship, and feminism, we
can chart how Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law engages the three
understandings of "tenderness": money, solicitude, and individuality. The
following discussion explores ways in which the three senses of tenderness
arise in relation to the spousal-guarantee cases and also notes instances where
tenderness comes up in other contexts in the book, such as chapters about the
postal rule of Adams v. Lindsell, premarital agreements, and alternative dispute
51. Id. § 2-201 (2003) (providing for enforceability of agreements even without a writing signed by
the person against whom enforcement is sought where a merchant sends a confirming memorandum,
goods are specially manufactured, the party resisting enforcement admits to contract formation, or the
parties have delivered and/or accepted the goods or payment).
52. Id. § 2-202.
53. Id. § 2-508.
54. Id. § 2-715. A buyer covers, in Article 2, when she obtains substitute goods in the wake of the
seller's breach. Id. § 2-712.
55. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 27.
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resolution. I focus on spousal-guarantee cases since nearly a third (two of
seven) of the substantive chapters of the book focus on them.
56
A. Legal Tender
It makes sense to start with money, since contracts are usually about
money. Courts are better able to award money damages than things like
cheerful participation in a family dinner, and the doctrine of consideration
distinguishes enforceable (legal) agreements from non-enforceable (extralegal)
ones.57 Conventional wisdom accepts the bargain theory of consideration,
which justifies legal enforcement on the fact that parties give and get something
of value to induce promises or performance. 58 In addition to affecting doctrine,
money matters on a practical level. Money might not buy happiness, but it can
buy things that facilitate happiness, such as therapy, an apartment, three square
meals a day, mammograms, chemotherapy, flattering blue jeans, dinner out
with a date, CDs, music lessons, and beach vacations.
59
Some scholars flag the importance of money to full participation in the
polity with the term "economic citizenship," as distinguished from "political
citizenship." First-wave feminism sought political citizenship for women
through reforms such as female suffrage, and second-wave feminists similarly
fought to reform rape law and secure reproductive freedoms. But feminists in
both eras also pursued economic citizenship for women.61 Women's liberty to
pursue a profession, to be free from sex discrimination in compensation and
56. See Auchmuty, supra note 29; Adam Gearey, Women Lie Back Everywhere, supra note 5, at 91.
In addition, Belinda Fehlberg and Bruce Smyth mention the spousal-guarantee case Royal Bank of
Scotland v. Etridge (No.2) in passing. Belinda Fehlberg & Bruce Smyth, Binding Prenuptial Agreements
in Australia: The First Year, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 125, 130.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) (requiring mutual assent and
consideration for an agreement to be legally enforceable).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) ("To constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for .... A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise."). Some contracts scholars disagree on precisely what makes certain
agreements legally binding, such as the intent to be legally bound, or reliance. See, e.g., GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 72 (12th prtg. 1982) (1974); Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
59. Money of course also buys things that bring misery, such as illegal and addictive drugs, or an
expensive education culminating in a lifetime of soul-deadening employment.
60. Other nineteenth-century feminist reforms included raising the age of consent. Jane E. Larson,
"Even a Worm Will Turn at Last ": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1(1997).
61. In the eighteenth century, only male property holders were entitled to exercise the citizenship
right of voting, and married women could not hold property in their own names. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 146 (3d ed. 2005). Although married women's property acts entitled
married women to own property, among other things, American women did not obtain the right to vote
until 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Even now, property ownership continues to convey citizenship
rights. Homeowners enjoy more security physically and financially than do renters, and both of these
more than residents of single-room-occupancy hotels and homeless people. Michelle Adams, Knowing
Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 17 (1998).
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work conditions, and to take out loans are all related to economic citizenship.
62
Indeed, the feminization of poverty has been a major strand of feminist theory
and activism in the last generation. 63 The fact that financial wherewithal
facilitates protection of both intimate and public freedoms that constitute
citizenship reveals an overlap between political and economic citizenship.
64
The right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy is constrained by
restrictions on the use of federal funds to perform abortions.65 Moreover, given
women's continued responsibility for most care-giving labor, one can say that
the cases protecting women's power to control when and whether one has
children 66 helped facilitate women's entrance into the professions in significant
numbers starting in the 1970s.
67
Like most contracts and many feminist issues, spousal-guarantee cases deal
with money. For example, if a bank wants to collect a loan that it extended to
cover a husband's business debts, the bank can foreclose on the family home if
the wife signed as surety. The facts of the eight separate cases heard together in
Etridge (No. 2) illustrate some ways these obligations may arise:
* Mrs. Moore signed a blank mortgage application form at her
husband's urging after he misinformed her of the amount of the
loan, and without receiving any legal advice.
68
* Mrs. Harris signed documents upon her husband's request without
knowing what she signed "because she trusted him."
69
* Mrs. Coleman, a Hasidic Jew, had been raised "to expect and to
accept a position of subservience and obedience to her husband,"
so that she was "not merely disinclined to second-guess her
husband on matters of business, but appears to have regarded
herself as obliged not to do so."
70
* Mrs. Gill signed the document under pressure to act quickly,
despite a "heated altercation" with her husband after he asked her
to mortgage the family home, believing (along with the solicitor
62. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (2000); Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. (2000); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
63. KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE
WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK (1997); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED (1994).
64. Charles A. Reich, Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle
Americans and the Poor, 71 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 817, 817 (1996).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)(5), (a)(17), (a)(21), (b)(1), (b)(7) (1994). These patterns are not new.
Long ago, Jacobus ten Broek observed that there are two branches of family law, one for the rich, and
another for the poor. See JACOBUS TEN BROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR: ESSAYS (Joel Handler ed.,
1971).
66. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (citing ROSALIND POLLACK
PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM 109, 133 n.7 (rev. ed. 1990)).
68. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 66.




who advised her) that the loan was for £36,000 rather than the
actual amount of £100,000, and feeling that she "had no
alternative but to sign.
' 71
Because these facts raise serious questions about the genuineness of wives'
consent to the guarantees, English courts presume undue influence or
misrepresentation in cases where the surety and debtor are spouses or
cohabitants. However, banks are allowed to rebut this presumption by
establishing that the surety fully understood the nature and consequences of the
transaction-that she could lose her home.72 This rule causes banks to give
special notice to each wife/surety of the amount of her potential liability and of
the risks involved, and to advise her to get independent legal advice.
Contracts scholar Gillian Hadfield has introduced this line of cases to
American students of contracts.73 She recognizes that the notice required under
English law does little to remedy the tangle of sexual and emotional factors
producing marital agreements. Instead of notice, she proposes that the will
theory of contract be supplemented with a reliance-based theory of contract in
certain special cases, such as spousal-guarantees, surrogacy, and marital
separation agreements. In these cases, Hadfield contends, reliance should
supplement the will theory because the parties' consent might not represent a
true balancing of future costs and benefits as it would in commercial
transactions.
74
Rosemary Auchmuty's chapter in Feminist Perspectives, "The Rhetoric of
Equality and the Problem of Heterosexuality" takes Hadfield's discussion
further. Auchmuty proposes a ban on using the family home as collateral in
place of the undue influence doctrine's bar to enforcement of some guaranties.
Auchmuty explains in her chapter that the House of Lords extended the
"tenderness" English courts ordinarily show to married women in mortgage
cases as a matter of equity to "a wife (or anyone in a like position)" and "a
husband (or anyone in a like position)." 75 Auchmuty takes issue with this
extension.
Auchmuty begins with Cicily Hamilton's 1909 assertion that "marriage for
woman has always been not only a trade, but a trade that is practically
compulsory," which she then links to Adrienne Rich's contention seventy years
later that heterosexuality is compulsory. 76 What bothers Auchmuty is how the
71. Id. at 68.
72. Id. at 52-53.
73. Hadfield, supra note 36, at 1245. Hadfield also suggests that giving notice to wives but not
husbands might give rise to sex discrimination claims on the ground that women, but not men, are
required to incur the expense of independent legal advice. Id. at 1247.
74. Id. at 1282-84.
75. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 51, 52.
76. Id. at 57-58 (citing CICILY HAMILTON, MARRIAGE AS A TRADE 28 (1909) and ADRIENNE RICH,
BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY 23 (1980)). I made the same link between Hamilton and Rich in Martha
M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. Civ. R & Civ. LIB.
REV. 79, 95-96 (2001).
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new doctrine obscures the abuses inherent in heterosexuality by extending the
undue influence doctrine beyond marriage to same-sex couples.77 She contends
that she is not "advocating the introduction of a special rule for women but,
rather, an acknowledgment that the 'normal' expectations of gendered roles and
conduct within heterosexual relationships are neither inevitable nor natural but
socially constructed, structurally inequitable, and potentially oppressive to
women." 78 Specifically, Auchmuty critiques the extension of the undue
influence rule to gay people, because, she argues, they are less likely to need it
since they are "more egalitarian" and "free of gendered power differential.,
79
Therefore, Auchmuty contends, women suffer injury through heterosexuality
itself rather than through discrete injuries resulting from a particularly bad deal.
Her solution to this injury is not the band-aid of presumptions of undue
influence, but rather a tourniquet-cutting off the entire class of transactions.
Auchmuty proposes "a ban or limitation.., on the availability of the
family home as security for business debts" and presents this solution as
reflecting a "prioritization of what is important to most women-their home
and family--over the masculine concern of business profits."80 Auchmuty
herself, however, is pessimistic about courts adopting her proposal.8' While
Auchmuty's proposal is not inconsistent with American limitations on
particular kinds of collateral, such as wages, bank accounts, and consumer
goods,8 2 American law does not prevent debtors (directly or as sureties) from
mortgaging their homes to secure business debts.
American law formerly evidenced some concern for wives in spousal
guarantee cases, but that concern seems to have gone out of fashion with the
corset. "Voluntary" sureties, who guarantee loans without compensation, are
generally family members or other intimates. Recognizing this special context,
legal doctrine has long treated voluntary sureties as "favorites of the law,"
strictly construing the agreement in the surety's favor.83 In 1923, the Maine
77. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 51 ("1 argue that the case law reveals that undue influence is the
consequence not of the dangers of intimacy per se, but of the dangers of heterosexual intimacy, or
simply of heterosexuality itself.").
78. Id. at 71.
79. Id. While data does suggest that gay men and lesbians are more egalitarian than heterosexual
couples in dividing housework, gendered differences do exist within same-sex relationships, in which
one man may take on more masculine work, for example, than the other. CHRISTOPHER CARRINGTON,
NO PLACE LIKE HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY LIFE AMONG LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (2002).
80. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 71.
81. Id.
82. Article 9 of the U.C.C. does not govern transactions in which the debtor's wages are collateral,
federal law and state statutes closely regulate wage assignments. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(3) cmt. 11 (2003).
Similarly, Article 9 does not cover transactions in which bank accounts are collateral in consumer
transactions. Id. § 9-109(d)(13). Moreover, section 9-204 prevents creditors from taking security
interests in consumer goods acquired by debtors more than ten days after the secured party gives value,
id. § 9-204, and a Federal Trade Commission regulation limits creditors' rights to obtain security
interests in "household goods." 16 C.F.R. § 444.1 et seq. (1999). A home is usually the most valuable
thing people own, making it considerably more attractive to creditors than wages, deposit accounts, and
consumer goods.
83. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Northern Ohio Granite & Stone Co., 126 N.E. 405 (Ohio 1919).
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Supreme Judicial Court recognized that sureties who guarantee debts for family
members faced relaxed proof requirements in establishing duress:
Ordinarily the claim of duress ... must be sustained by threats which
create a reasonable fear of loss of life or of great bodily harm or of
imprisonment .... But there are exceptions to this rule, based on the
nearness and tenderness of family relations and the obviously
constraining force of close family ties.
8
In 1926, the Supreme Court of Kansas described the protection of voluntary
sureties as an "old rule." 85 By 1961, the Supreme Court of Minnesota enforced
Miss Dorothy Lewis's guarantee to pay the rent of a gift shop called The Purple
Door for Richard Pohl, despite the fact that she received no consideration,
specifically rejecting "judicial tenderness in dealing with the rights and
liabilities of sureties." 86 Today, wives who guarantee their husbands' business
debts can avoid losing their homes only if they show that the lending institution
knew of or participated in the husband's duress, misrepresentation, undue
influence, or fraud.87 Thus, in one case, a wife was not bound where she signed
an incomplete promissory note with her husband, and the husband then forged
her signature on the check that was jointly issued to both of them and used the
funds to buy stock in his name alone. 88 However, these facts are extreme. In
another, more typical, case, a court enforced a promissory note which a wife
signed only "because I trusted my husband and his judgment on business
affairs. I understood from my husband that if the document was not signed my
husband's business relationship with his attorney would be harmed." 89 In this
case, the court reasoned that a husband's mere persuasion did not overcome his
wife's free will. In short, American contract law worries less than English law
about the validity of married women's agreements to guarantee their husbands'
debts, a difference that also plays out in Australian and American doctrine
governing marital contracting.
Before transitioning from legal tender to tenderness, it is worth pausing to
note the counterintuitive conclusion of Belinda Fehlberg and Bruce Smyth's
chapter in Feminist Perspectives, which reports the results of their empirical
84. Flynt v. J. Waterman Co., 122 A. 862, 863 (Me. 1923). The court goes on to cite cases
involving fiancres, spouses, parents and children, aunts and nephews, and siblings. Id.
85. Headley v. Post, 243 P. 1042, 1044 (Kan. 1926) ("[T]he old rule that a surety is a favorite of the
law arose from judicial tenderness toward voluntary and accommodation sureties.").
86. Southdale Ctr. v. Lewis, 110 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn. 1961).
87. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.10 (2006). Corbin lists the four elements of a prima facie case of
undue influence: (1) susceptibility of the party influenced (such as mental or physical weakness); (2) the
opportunity to exercise undue influence (such as through a confidential relationship, including spouses
or cohabitants); (3) a disposition to exercise undue influence (i.e., whether the influencer took the
intitative in the transaction and whether the person influenced had independent advice); and (4) the
unnatural nature of the transaction (as when a testator leaves significant property outside the family). For
two cases in which wives did not satisfy the burden of proof, see Sims v. First Nat'! Bank, 590 S.W.2d
270 (Ark. 1979); and Lesser v. Strubbe, 171 A.2d 114, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961), aff'd 1887
A.2d 705 (N.J. 1963).
88. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1997).
89. Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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study of changing doctrines governing Australian prenuptial agreements.
90
They begin with the familiar observation that men tend to benefit more than
women from prenuptial contracts. Since men are more likely to have economic
and social power, they are often able to induce their wives to contract around
the default rules of property and support.91 Thus, one would expect that
feminists-and women generally-would oppose Australia's adoption of the
American and Canadian rules enforcing prenuptial agreements. While Fehlberg
and Smyth found that people were likely to use prenuptial contracts when one
spouse had more assets than the other, they also found that prenuptial
agreements tend to appear when one or both parties are marrying for a second
time, have had previous family court involvement, or want to quarantine a
family asset or business. 92 Contrary to their expectations-and to American
conventional wisdom-Fehlberg and Smyth found that women were just as
likely as men to seek premarital agreements. They point out that this data is not
necessarily surprising, since older women entering second marriages may want
to protect property and finances. 93 Viewing their chapter in the context of the
rest of the book, one can say that the tenderness that law expresses to women in
facilitating the protection of their assets cuts various ways. Some women
benefit from contract (as when they quarantine individually held assets from
the claims of a second husband), and others do not (as when a richer partner
quarantines his own assets from her).
B. Tenderness
Legal protections for women based on their vulnerability as dependents
and as caregivers for dependents similarly cut both ways. On the one hand, it
makes sense to protect vulnerable parties. Commercial and corporate law do
that through a variety of rules protecting, for example, debtors and minority
shareholders in close corporations. 94 But the history of women and African-
Americans' second-class citizenship, and the way contract law reflected and
perpetuated that hierarchy, signal a downside to such an approach. I have
already discussed the way that tenderness (in particular protecting women's
access to legal tender) plays out in the spousal-guarantee context. The
90. Fehlberg & Smyth, supra note 56, at 125.
91. Id. at 127.
92. Id. at 133.
93. Id. at 134. The authors do not say that these women might want to protect property for children
from their first marriages. However, this would trigger the second sense of "tender": kindness toward
vulnerable parties.
94. For protections of debtors in secured transitions, see generally U.C.C. § 9-601 et seq. (2003).
For discussions of protections for minority shareholders being frozen out of closely held corporations,
see F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC
MEMBERS § 9.26 (3d ed. 1998). Those protections undercut claims that other vulnerable or minority
groups should not enjoy protections through affirmative action and family law. See Aunpam Chander,




following discussion addresses solicitude for women in three other doctrinal
areas in Feminist Perspectives: the postal rule in Adams v. Lindsell; prenuptial
agreements; and alternative dispute resolution.
1. Tenderness and the Postal Rule
Peter Goodrich's intriguing chapter in Feminist Perspectives on Contract
Law sets out a genealogy of the postal rule, linking it with the formation of
contracts to marry. Goodrich traces the history of the rule's evolution,
explaining that the rule was not widely accepted for nearly a century.95 The
most interesting point for our purposes is his assertion that "every contract is
like a marriage.' 96 He argues that the ecclesiastical rules governing marriage
migrated into assumpsit cases through breach of promise to marry cases, and
that this migration included the postal rule. The postal rule gives preference to
the offeree's interests by making an acceptance legally valid at the moment it
leaves the offeree's hands, protecting her from an offeror's fickleness by
depriving him of the right to revoke after dispatch but before receipt. This
deference, one might say tenderness, to the offeree is directly related to the
breach of promise to marry cases that proliferated in the nineteenth century.
Since men proposed marriage and women accepted, the postal rule expressed
tenderness toward the woman's honor. As Goodrich explains, "[r]ecognition of
the social standing and the cultural expectations of the feminine offeree, and
attention to her position and predicament, meant that equity clearly favoured
protecting her reliance interest in the offer and preventing the offeror from
speculating." 97 While Goodrich is careful not to overstate his case for the link
between marriage and commercial contracts, 98 he unequivocally asserts that the
"doctrinal root of that desire to protect the offeree can be traced directly to
cases of breach of promise to marry." 99 Beyond the particulars of the postal
rule, this observation reminds students of contracts that tenderness for
systemically vulnerable parties (debtors and tenants as well as women on
occasion) is an integral part of contract doctrine. It is, moreover, not always a
bad thing.
2. Tenderness and Premarital Agreements
Like the spousal-guarantee cases, the premarital agreement doctrine
discussed above in the Fehlberg and Smyth's study seeks special protections
for women in contracts associated with marriage. As Australian law changed to
allow enforcement of premarital contracts as well as contracts entered during
95. Goodrich, supra note 10, at 81-82.
96. Id. at 81-86.
97. Id. at 85.
98. Id. at 81.
99. Id. at 83.
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marriage, it built in protections for women. Yet some of these protections
inhibited the effectiveness of the new statute.' 00 Most notably, insurers refused
to provide malpractice insurance to cover the attorney certification that the new
law made a prerequisite to legal enforceability. The statute required attorneys to
certify whether the agreement was to the signer's advantage, was fair, and was
prudent. Legal malpractice insurers refused to extend coverage for the required
certifications, contending that an attorney's views on these matters amounted to
financial rather than legal advice. 10 1 Moreover, even if an attorney did state in
the certificate of independent legal advice that the client was signing "under a
continuing economic disadvantage-for example emotional pressure," the
statement might not prevent enforcement of the agreement since suretyship
case law provides that independent legal counsel may be enough to bind the
client despite such a statement.' 02 But the rarity of marital contracting-
Fehlberg and Smyth found that only 13 couples out of 650 surveyed entered
into such agreements °3-makes the discussion as much or more about the
expressive function of the law as about a pressing legal issue. Perhaps spousal-
guarantees get more attention in the book because they have generated
considerable case law, which may occur because the banks involved can absorb
the transaction costs of litigation better than individuals. 1
04
3. Tenderness and Alternative Dispute Resolution
But there can be downsides to special treatment, and indeed to theoretical
approaches that make general claims about contract law and gender. Linda
Mulcahy's chapter, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Flaws? The Feminisation
of Dispute Resolution," both flags and falls into this trap. Mulcahy begins with
the premise that mediation benefits women in three ways: (1) by rejecting
"masculine values of the courtroom"; (2) by "privileging values associated with
feminism, which reflect an ethic of care and the importance of context and
relationship"; and (3) by "facilitating political goals by raising awareness of
masculine paradigms."' 5 But her contention that classical contract doctrine,
more than other legal doctrines, articulates "hostile egoism and possessive
100. The Australian statute in place at the time of the study dictated that premarital and postmarital
agreements bind if they are in writing, signed by both parties, each party has received independent legal
advice, and the agreement has not been terminated by the parties. Fehlberg & Smyth, supra note 56, at
129. The requirement of independent legal advice is satisfied if an attorney appends a statement that she
provided independent legal advice as to the effect of the agreement on her client's rights, whether it was
to the advantage, financially or otherwise, of the client, whether it was prudent for that party to make the
agreement, and whether the agreement's provisions were fair and reasonable. Id. The authors note that
these rules soon faced legislative amendment to relax the attorney certification provisions. Id. at 125 n.1.
101. Id. at 135.
102. Id. at 136-37.
103. Id. at 128.
104. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000).
105. Mulcahy, supra note 14, at 145.
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individualism" by taking people away from the "preexisting web of
community ' 06 overlooks the facts that individualism and possession of
property, as discussed above, can be a good thing for many women, and also
that communities can enforce gender norms at the expense of individual
interests. Moreover, describing Richard Posner's approach as "high octane
masculine values" and condemning privatization' 0 7 overlooks the fact that
some feminists have relied on his work and contractual norms of "performance,
control, security of transaction and standardization"' 108 to justify feminist
reforms and believe that privatization can both help and hurt women. 10 9 These
insights bring us to the third sense of "tender," relative to contract law and
women's independence.
C. Tend Her
The phrase "tend her," a play on the "tenderness" theme of this Review, is
admittedly an oblique way to raise issues of individuality within the "tender"
rubric. But it does question the advisability of legal doctrine protecting women,
as opposed to leaving them to tend to themselves. I raise it here to pull out the
strand associated with tending oneself, and in doing so to engage any systemic
conflicts between classical views of the will-based theory of contract on the one
hand and feminist impulses to occasionally protect women from bad deals on
the other. As discussed above, some chapters in Feminist Perspectives propose
that contract law adjust to protect women from bad choices in some contexts,
such as with the spousal-guarantee cases.
David Campbell's afterword makes it clear that he thinks this is a bad idea.
He directly engages the question of contracts protecting the individual's
interests by contesting Auchmuty's proposed ban on wives guaranteeing their
husbands' business debts with the family home. Campbell suggests that
Auchmuty seeks a special rule to protect women and argues that her rule harms
the very people she seeks to protect by infantilizing them." 0 He contends that
feminist theory works better in alternative dispute resolution than contract
formation, lauding Linda Mulcahy's chapter championing alternative dispute
resolution as "the most accomplished chapter" in the book.",
106. Id. at 147.
107. Id. at 147, 153.
108. Id. at 147.
109. See, e.g., HIRSI-IMAN & LARSON, supra note 3, at 284-86; Martha M. Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 97-110 (1998); Silbaugh, supra note 3.
110. David Campbell, Afterword: Feminism, Liberalism and Utopianism in the Analysis of
Contracting, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 165.
111. Id. at 162. He does not mention that a line of American feminist scholarship has questioned
whether the soft and fuzzy norms of ADR might disserve some women in divorce proceedings, nor that
ADR can be more rigid than litigation in its norms and substantive rules. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766-71 (1996); Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce
Settlement Negotiations, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 931 (1997).
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Many feminists would share his view that special rules protecting married
women in contracting situations with their husbands smack of the kind of
"repugnant paternalism" 112 that created the need for feminism in the first place.
Rejecting Hadfield's proposed importation of Elizabeth Anderson's expressive
values in contract to supplement the will theory of enforcement, Campbell
asserts that contract law based on any value other than party autonomy is not
contract law:
The chapters in this volume show that feminism certainly can make a
considerable contribution to the critique of the classical law of
contract, and they link to an economic and philosophical literature in
which feminism is putting forward a powerful general critique of
bourgeois individualism. However, if they do not place a pre-eminent
value on autonomy, feminists cannot really respect the law of contract,
for a law of contract that does not turn on autonomy and choice
becomes something like a law of planned, paternalistic exchanges, that
is, not contract at all."l3
If Campbell is right, then the entire book is a contradiction in terms, except to
the extent that "feminist" views of contract are limited to liberal critiques of
contract rules that exclude women from the rights that men enjoy. But
feminism is much broader than that, incorporating cultural feminist focus on
relationships (and legal protections of the vulnerabilities that arise from those
relationships), as well as radical feminist efforts to upend cultural categories of
sex and gender.
Indeed, I would argue that Hadfield's expressive theory of contract finds
considerable ground in existing contract doctrine. Hadfield chooses three
puzzles of contract law-surrogacy, spousal-guarantees, and marital separation
contracts-and proposes that legal doctrine could "transcend the dilemma of
choice":
The structure of a contract law based on an appreciation of expressive
choice would begin with an assessment of whether a given category of
contract normally is entered into in a risk-allocation frame. Absent the
risk-allocation frame, there is a need to assess the reasons there might
be for enforcement. 
114
She suggests that where parties do not enter contracts conscious of risk-
allocation, courts look to two things: (1) reliance interests at stake; and (2)
instrumental justifications for enforcement in light of the value of the contract
and the risk non-enforcement poses for contract law generally. 115 The spousal-
guarantee cases are particularly good examples of agreements entered into with
a richer relational aspect than most, and a thinner risk-allocation aspect than
most. Here, Hadfield persuasively argues that relational principles come to the
112. Campbell, supra note 110, at 172.
113. Id.




fore, including cooperation over time, reliance through coordination,
communication, and commitment. In her words, "they are woven from and into
a fabric of societal and relationship-specific norms."
' 1 6
As we evaluate the extent to which contract doctrine that accounts for
hierarchy at the expense of autonomy is still contract doctrine, it is important to
keep in mind that contract has never been one thing in relation to have-nots.
Freedmen were held to coercive labor contracts that replicated slavery in many
respects, 17 and labor conditions entered into under purported freedom of
contract were often brutal for both men and women.' 18 Reva Siegel has coined
the term "preservation through transformation" to describe the process by
which purported improvements to the legal status of blacks and women have
also perpetuated hierarchies." 
9
Sally Wheeler's chapter in Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law
illustrates one strand of nineteenth century views of married women and
contract. She describes how doctrines relating to coverture (including the
doctrine of necessaries and the state-supplied marriage contract itself)
constrained Victorian women's contractual powers to buy clothing.' Married
women's property acts changed much of that baseline by granting married
women rights to contract as well as to hold and dispose of property, but courts
interpreted them narrowly to keep most property, and thus independence, away
from women. 121 Interestingly, these rights of economic citizenship predated
women's political citizenship. Married women exercised their (albeit limited)
rights under the married women's property acts for half a century before they
got the vote, and for nearly a century before they served on juries with any
regularity.
122
116. Id. at 1283-84.
117. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (2002).
For an argument linking nineteenth- and early twentieth-century peonage contracts to the Thirteenth
Amendment and late twentieth-century welfare reform, see Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340 (1994).
118. STANLEY, supra note 42, at 76-84. The high-water mark for classical liberalism in labor law is
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Given the importance for women of defining the limits and
beneficial applications of contract, it is hardly surprising that the demise of liberalism is conventionally
linked to judicial acceptance of fair-labor laws protecting women. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
119. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1997).
120. Sally Wheeler, Going Shopping, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 21. The doctrine
of necessaries held a husband liable for debts incurred by his wife for small items, a rule which turned
on married women's incapacity to contract under coverture. A number of courts have held the doctrine
of necessaries unconstitutional as applied to women, but it continues to apply when minors enter
contractual relationships or where gender neutral. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and
the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital
Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 75 n.30 (1998).
121. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127 (1994).
122. LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES 136-220 (1998). Indeed,
military service, one of the hallmarks of citizenship, is still not open to women on the same basis as
men. For a review of the history of American women and military service, see id. at 221-302.
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The fact that women's rights to contract laid the foundation for women's
political rights makes Charles Fried's condemnation of the infantilizing effect
of departures from assumptions of autonomy particularly persuasive. He
explains:
If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation because
we do not take seriously the promisor's prior conception of the good
that led him to assume it, to that extent we do not take him seriously as
a person. We infantilise him [as we do quite properly when we release
the very young from the consequences of their choices]. 
123
Adult autonomy is all the more important when we consider the unique role of
contract in skirting majoritarian rules. For example, testators can "contract"
around default rules provided by intestacy law to bequeath their property to an
intimate, such as a same-sex partner, whom the state refuses to recognize
through intestacy laws. Similarly, adoptive parents can "contract" with birth
parents for visitation to facilitate connection between adoptive children and the
birth parents despite the state's failure or refusal to recognize that
relationship. 124
There is a lot to be said for contract's ability to skirt hostile background
rules. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 1978 revolution changed the law to
value women half as much as men (setting them back 1400 years). Nobel
laureate Shirin Ebadi managed to contract around the new rules that gave her
husband the power to divorce her at will, take custody of their children, and
acquire three wives, which would have allowed her husband to stay a person
while she became chattel. Outraged by these rules (despite the fact that her
husband had no intention of exercising the powers they gave him), she took
him to a notary's office, where he waived his newly acquired rights under the
Islamic Republic's law. 
125
Contract reasoning and doctrine also remedy more mundane problems. At
the doctrinal level, primary homemakers' contributions to family wealth could
be recognized in contractual terms. 126 On a theoretical level, I have contended
that the law can and should recognize a range of intimate relationships just as it
123. Campbell, supra note 110, at 166 (quoting FRIED, supra note 27, at 20-21).
124. Even if some contracts, such as contracts to buy sperm from anonymous donors, have the
downside of depriving children of contact with one genetic parent, perhaps the remedy for this kind of
"bad" contract is more contracting. The demand for familial connection among sperm bank babies has
created a market for that connection, satisfied through membership in an online registry of children who
are genetically related but would not otherwise know each other. Membership in the registry is $40 a
year. Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19 2006, at 44, 81. See also
Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
125. Laura Secor, Book Review, A Dissenting Voice, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2006, § 7, at 14
(reviewing SHIRIN EBADI WITH AZADEH MOAVENI, IRAN AWAKENING: A MEMOIR OF REVOLUTION AND
HOPE (2006)).
126. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls,
Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67 (1993). An alternative
model is based on Article 9 of the U.C.C. and contends that primary wage earners are indebted to their
primary homemaking spouses, giving homemakers an entitlement to part of the wage-eamers' post-
divorce income as repayment of the debt. Ertman, supra note 109.
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recognizes a range of business forms, analogizing marriage to a close
corporation, cohabitation to a general partnership, and polyamory to a limited
liability company.1 27 Jane Larson and Linda Hirshman have suggested that
game theory can level the playing field of men and women in sexual matters,
128
Adrienne Davis has documented the ways that some white men's wills
bequeathing property to their black paramours in the nineteenth century
recognized relationships that intestacy law would not, 129 and Elizabeth Emens
has recently suggested that contractual analysis of marital name changes might
dislodge the practice of women taking men's names upon marriage. 130
The fruitfulness of applying feminist views to contract, and contractual
views to feminist questions, is illustrated by an American case, Borelli v.
Brusseau.13 1 While Borelli does not appear in Feminist Perspectives (which is
hardly surprising since nearly all the cases discussed are English), it does
appear in some casebooks. Discussing Borelli in contracts class makes sense
because the case shows both the benefits and limits of contractual analysis, and
also how courts selectively recognize contract doctrine in situations of
contested marketization, such as contracts within families and for organ
sales. 132 Most startling is how the case demonstrates how the old rules
regarding gender still bleed through to contemporary cases.
In Borelli, the California Court of Appeals refused to enforce a husband's
promise to convey property to his wife in exchange for her promise to care for
him at home after he suffered a stroke. (The alternative was a nursing home.)
Three contracts were at issue: (1) a premarital agreement in which Hildegard
Borelli waived her rights to Michael Borelli's property; (2) his oral promise to
alter that prenuptial agreement to substitute her care for nursing home care; and
(3) the state-imposed marital contract. The feminist reader with a chip on her
shoulder will note that all three contracts were construed against Hildegard, and
that she would have been better off in a regime that either refused to enforce
the prenuptial agreement or was willing to enforce the postnuptial agreement.
Mrs. Borelli signed the premarital agreement waiving her rights to
substantial property the day before their wedding.' 33 While in a rehabilitation
center after Mr. Borelli suffered a stroke, they orally agreed that Mrs. Borelli
would provide nursing-home type care in their home in exchange for his
promise to leave her property beyond what she would receive under the
127. Ertman, supra note 76.
128. See, e.g., HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 3, at 283-86.
129. Davis, supra note 3.
130. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
131. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1993). At least one leading contracts casebook includes Borelli. See
CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PIERCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 705 (4th ed. 2001).
132. For a discussion of marketization of human organs, see MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK
MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR BODY PARTS (2006).
133. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
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prenuptial agreement. 134 When he died his estate refused to honor the oral
agreement. The California Court of Appeal held that the oral agreement lacked
consideration since she had a non-delegable obligation to care for her husband
under the state-defined marriage contract. It relied on World War II-era case
law to reach this result:
[A] wife is obligated by the marriage contract to provide nursing-type
care to an ill husband. Therefore, contracts whereby the wife is to
receive compensation for providing such services are void as against
public policy and there is no consideration for the husband's
promise. 
35
At the time these cases were decided, spouses could not contract away
obligations of support or property settlement.' 36 However, by the time the
Borellis entered their marriage the law had changed, so that Michael Borelli
could have his cake and eat it, too, by altering the part of the state-provided
marriage contract that mandated property-sharing with his wife, and keeping
the part that compelled her to personally nurse him through illness.
Surprisingly, Mr. Borelli's alteration of his support obligations the day
before the wedding did not figure into the majority opinion (and was only
tangentially mentioned in the dissent). The court explained:
[T]he duty of support can no more be "delegated" to a third party than
the statutory duties of fidelity and mutual respect. Marital duties are
owed by the spouses personally. This is implicit in the definition of
marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between
a man and a woman."
137
In essence, the court allowed Mr. Borelli to alter the "civil contract" regarding
property distribution in marriage, but refused to allow Mrs. Borelli to alter her
care-taking responsibilities:
We therefore adhere to the longstanding rule that a spouse is not
entitled to compensation for support, apart from rights to community
property and the like that arise from the marital relation itself.
Personal performance of a personal duty created by the contract of
marriage does not constitute new consideration.1
38
The clause "apart from rights to community property and the like" does a lot of
work. Mrs. Borelli did not get her share of community property because of the
prenuptial contract, but she was still stuck personally providing round-the-clock
care.
Maybe this outcome is okay. Perhaps money and love are analytically
separate. 139 Maybe Mr. Borelli can contract away his obligations to share
134. Id. at 17-18.
135. Id. at 18-19 (citing In re Estate of Sonnicksen, 73 P.2d 643, 645 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937);
Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970, 971-73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)).
136. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
137. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (1992)).
138. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
139. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 28-29.
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property with her but retain her obligation to care for him during an illness. The
majority opinion implies as much in defending itself against the dissent's
criticism of the old case law's gendered foundations, stating that "[i]f the rule
denying compensation for support originated from considerations peculiar to
women, this has no bearing on the rule's gender-neutral application today."'
140
But marriage remains highly gendered, as reflected by the fact that wives still
do seventy percent of homemaking labor (a specialization that must affect how
husbands and wives care for one another during illness) and husbands still have
higher incomes on average and control more property than women.14 1 Indeed,
in the United States, men are more likely to seek to protect their separate
property through premarital agreements, and women are more likely to contest
them. 
142
Judge Poche's dissent argues for the benefits of contract over status by
accusing the majority of resuscitating coverture and by defending contractual
understandings of marriage:
Insofar as marital duties and property rights are not governed by
positive law, they may be the result of informal accommodation or
formal agreement .... No longer can the marital relationship be
regarded as "uniform and unchangeable."
143
Moreover, he continues, California has long granted husbands and wives "the
utmost freedom of contract" in both statute and case law.
144
But a close read of California's statutory creation of contractual freedom
between husbands and wives may support the majority's view that Mr. Borelli
may sell Mrs. Borelli down the river financially and still compel her to provide
round-the-clock care. The statute provided that "either husband or wife may
enter into any transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting
property, which either might if unmarried." 145 Thus it seems that, at least in this
context, men are more likely to benefit from the increased contractualization of
marital rights and obligations. Indeed, for over three decades courts have
enforced premarital agreements, and these agreements are likely to benefit the
richer spouse, who is more likely to be the husband than the wife. Under
Borelli, caregiver spouses, who are more likely to be wives than husbands,
cannot limit the obligations they are most likely to bear, i.e. care-giving. In
short, what is good for the gander can stink for the goose.
140. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
141. Yun-Suk Lee & Linda J. Waite, Husbands' and Wives' Time Spent on Housework: A
Comparison of Measures, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 328 (2005).
142. Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127 (1993). But see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
143. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poche, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 23 (quoting Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 103 P. 190 (Cal. 1909); CAL. CIV. CODE
§5103(a) (Deering 1992) (repealed 1994) (providing that "either husband or wife may enter into any
transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which either might if
unmarried")). The rule is stated now in CAL. FAM. CODE §721 (2003).
145. CAL. CIv. CODE §5103(a) (Deering 1992) (repealed 1994) (emphasis added).
2006]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
IV. CONCLUSION
Feminism and contract have more in common than many people think, in
particular because both address problems of individual agency and
accountability that are important elements of full citizenship. In discussing
Feminist Perspectives, this Review has extracted themes that may enrich
contracts classes and feminist theory discussions. On the doctrinal level, Borelli
v. Brusseau tells us that perhaps courts should not enforce property agreements
between spouses since they would have a hard time enforcing the non-
delegable duties of sympathy, comfort, love, companionship, and affection in
the state-provided marriage contract. 146 Or perhaps the dissent in Borelli is
right, and Mrs. Borelli should at least be able to try to prove the oral
modification of the prenuptial contract with Mr. Borelli. Like other cases, this
contract dispute between spouses also tells us about the promise and danger of
contract analysis, much of which is represented in Feminist Perspectives on
Contract Law, and much of which might find its way into a contracts class:
In re Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert,147 two surrogacy cases, may
provide a springboard to discuss a number of issues. Carol Sanger
spends two full class sessions using Baby M to preview the
course's basic themes, including how to read a case, choice of law,
damages, and legal theory. 148 Within this discussion, a tension
generally emerges between enforceability and contractual
capacity. The impasse between capacity to contract and the
dehumananizing effects of surrogacy reflects an irresolvable
conflict between two equally good and important things: (1)
freedom of contract; and (2) protection of dignity, solidarity, and
equality. 149 Another route into the question of enforceability may
explore who benefits from contractualization, and in particular
how contract doctrine and theory are improved or harmed by using
contract to regulate contested contexts such as reproduction.
* It is difficult to ignore the fact that people resisting contract
enforcement in many canonical undue influence cases are female.
In Vokes v. Arthur Murray Dance Studios,l15 the plaintiff was a
lonely widow tricked into buying $31,000 of dance lessons by
146. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. L. REV. 65
(1998).
147. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert
den'd, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
148. Sanger, supra note 17.
149. For a fuller discussion of the antinomous qualities of freedom of contract versus equality,
dignity, and solidarity in commodification discussions, see Ertman & Williams, supra note 3.
150. 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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high praise for her nonexistent dancing abilities from Arthur
Murray Dance Studios. Does it matter that this doctrine tends to
protect women? In particular, does it undercut autonomy-based
definitions of contract? Is it significant that American law protects
these parties without explicitly referring to their gender, while
English law explicitly extends "special tenderness" to wives in
guarantee cases?
" In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 15 1 the canonical
unconscionability case, Mrs. Williams is female, poor, and
African-American. This combination of characteristics often leads
to rich classroom discussions about whether the doctrines of undue
influence and unconscionability are employed to remedy both the
historic and contemporary fragility of women, people of color and
poor people, and should be.
* If we recognize the marital roots of Adams v. Lindsell,152 the case
establishing that acceptance occurs at the time of dispatch by the
offeree, then at least in this context, the marriage contract rules
provide the basis for commercial contract doctrine. Under this
analysis, puzzles regarding marital contracts (similarly to or
differently from commercial contracts) might look quite different.
If marriage is the original and not the special case, the question
may be whether marital rules should apply to commercial
contracts, rather than vice versa. Moreover, the tremendous
changes of the marriage contract over time, which are akin to the
changes in employment contracts over the last century, illustrate
the legal realist idea that law keeps changing as society keeps
changing.
This Review has focused on English spousal-guarantee cases to provide a
particularly strong foundation for discussing ways that the contract law can
resolve monetary disputes, protect vulnerable parties whose consent might be
less than freely given, and recognize that parties' individuality is central to their
claims as adult members of the polity. Future work may explore whether these
three concerns relating to legal tenderness apply in other doctrinal areas, and in
doing so demonstrate the things feminism and contract law have to offer one
another.
151. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
152. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.).
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